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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant concede that this Court has jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's Appeal.

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Because disposition of a case on summary judgment denies the benefit of a trial on
the merits, the appellate court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
losing party, and affirm only where it appears there is no genuine dispute as to any material
issues of fact, or where, even according to the facts as contended by the losing party, the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Themy v. Seagull Enterprises.,
Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979).
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is a case in which Plaintiff/Appellant seeks to recover damages from selected
entities involved within a chain of transfers of a motor vehicle. Plaintif^Appellant contends
that the subject vehicle was a salvage vehicle and that he was not apprised of that fact and
withholding of that information gave rise to statutory and common law causes of action.
PROCEEDINGS AT THE TRIAL LEVEL
After discovery and limited motion practice Defendants/Appellees brought Motions
for Summary Judgment which Motions were granted by the trial court.

In granting

Summary Judgment the Court disposed of all issues of fact and law in favor or
Defendant/Appellees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On or about the 12th day of February 1997 the Defendant Economy Auto Inc.

was served with a Summons and Complaint in this action. The Defendant Economy Auto
Inc. is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah with it's
principal place of business in Cache County, State of Utah.
1

2.

Defendant American States Insurance Co., an insurance company doing

business in Utah was likewise served with Summons and Complaint.
3.

Sometime thereafter Defendant Clarendon National Insurance Co. Was

likewise served.
4-

The Defendant Clarendon National Insurance Co. Is a corporation organized

and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of New Jersey and is qualified to
transact business in the State of Utah.
5.

The Defendant Economy Auto is a licensed and bonded motor vehicle dealer

pursuant to The Utah Motor Vehicle Act.
6.

The Defendant Economy Auto Inc. does not, as a principal part of it's

business, offer automobiles to the public at retail, but concentrates on selling motor vehicles
and motor vehicle parts at wholesale but routinely sells motor vehicle parts at retail as well.
Occasionally Economy Auto Inc. will sell a used motor vehicle at retail but does not solicit
this type of business. Economy Auto does not maintain a retail sales lot, advertise retail
sales or have a staff versed in retail sale, techniques and practices.
7.

The Defendant Economy Auto Inc. is party to that certain Motor Vehicle

Dealers Bond # 95054257 as a principal and the Defendanl Clarendon National Insurance
Co. Is named therein as a surety and each is bound to the State of Utah as per their
undertaking in fulfillment of applicable law.
8.

At all times relevant to this proceeding the bond above referenced was in full

force and effect in this jurisdiction and provided such assurances and protections as are
required by Utah law.
9.

This

case

involves

a

certain

"Hummer"

motor

vehicle

VIN#137YA843XRE152325 which motor vehicle was manufactured by American General
Corporation of South Bend, Indiana; a domestic corporation in the business of
manufacturing new automobiles.

2
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16.

Ultimately, Hillcrest Service transferred their purchased interest to Plaintiff

and Plaintiff ultimately acquired the titled interest of Christensen subject to a security
interest held by Zions Bank, the entity from which Plaintiff borrowed a portion of the
purchase price.
17.

At the time that each of these transactions occurred the subject motor vehicle

was located in Salt Lake County or Davis County, and was not then nor never was registered
to or in the physical possession of any of the Defendants.
18.

Plaintiff personally inspected the vehicle before he purchased it while it was

at Carlson Cadillac in Salt Lake County, again while it was at Utah Auto Auction in Davis
County, Utah and again while it was in the possession of Hillcrest Service in Salt Lake
County.
19.

While the subject motor vehicle was at Carlson Cadillac in its damaged

condition the Plaintiff attempted to purchase the interest of American States but was
unsuccessful and upon learning of the transfer to the Defendant Economy Auto contacted
one of Economy's principals, Charlie Fullmer, again attempting to purchase the subject
motor vehicle. Fullmer as manager of Economy Auto, offered to sell the interest of
Economy Auto Inc. to Plaintiff for about $17,000.00 but Plaintiff did not accept the offer,
but did offer to pay Economy Auto $15,000.00.
20.

In the course of various unrelated business dealings between Economy Auto

Inc. and Western Affiliated1, Western Affiliated developed a purpose to offer the subject
motor vehicle for sale in it's damaged condition at a public auction conducted by Utah Auto
Auction. Western Affiliated, for consideration, took transfer of the interest of Economy
Auto Inc. and took physical possession of the motor vehicle from Carlson Cadillac and
arranged for the transportation of said motor vehicle to the premises of Utah Auto Auction

Western affiliated, a non party, is reputed to have been a dealer in used motor vehicles at
all pertinent times and may well have been bonded by Defendant Clarendon National The business has now been
sold to Copart Inc , which is still dealing in motor vehicles and motor vehicle parts, the present status of
Western Affiliated is unclear
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An interesting question arises from this transfer: does Plaintiff assert that the November 1998
transaction create new and separate causes of action whereby the transfer of Plaintiff's interest might proceed
against American States, Economy Auto, Western Affiliated, Utah Auto Auction, Hillcrest Services and James
Gordon Holmes?
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27.

Liability of Defendant Clarendon National must be predicated on a finding

of liability on the part of Defendant Economy Auto Inc., Defendant Clarendon has never
had any interest in or possession of the subject vehicle and is merely a surety for Defendant
Economy Auto.
28.

Defendant Economy Auto never transferred the motor vehicle in question to

itself or back to itself despite Plaintiff's allegation which surfaced for the first time in
Plaintiff/Appellants Brief at page 5.
ISSUES
I.

Does Utah Law, under the facts of this case, impose upon an entity acquiring

such interest as that acquired by Defendant Economy Auto and it's subsequent transferees
in this case, the duty to surrender title to the Utah State Department of Motor Vehicles for
the purpose of obtaining a salvage title?
II.

May the Plaintiff, under the facts of this case, prove damages in the absence

of issuance of a salvage title?
III.

Respecting the facts and pleadings of this case, do the Consumer Sales

Practices Act and the Uniform Commercial Code address the transaction in question?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Plaintiff, at the trial level, presented no competent evidence that the motor
vehicle in question is or was salvage and, in fact, all evidence admissible on that point at the
trial level was to the contrary.
The new vehicle warranty was unimpaired throughout it's intrinsic duration.
If the Plaintiff relies on statutory damages only, he neither pleaded nor proved facts
that give rise to a cause of action under the statute.
The Defendant has neither pleaded nor proved actual damage.

6

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

Does Utah Law, under the facts of this case, impose upon an entity acquiring

such interest as that acquired by Defendant Economy Auto and it's subsequent transferees
in this case, the duty to surrender title to the Utah State Department of Motor Vehicles for
the purpose of obtaining a salvage title?
29.

Under certain narrowly construed circumstances, certain classes of entities may

be required to surrender a Utah Motor Vehicle title and obtain therefore a salvage title in
the process of transferring their interest. The code sections relied upon by Plaintiff are
UCA 41-la-1004(2) and UCA 41-la-1005(4).3
30.

Plaintiff maintains that neither the Defendants American States nor the

Defendant Economy Auto, nor the non-parties Western Affiliated, Utah Auto Auction and
Hillcrest Service, in not Procuring a salvage title, did nothing to violate UCA 41-3-702
(l)(c)(VI) and 41-3-701 (3).
31.

UCA 41-la-1004 to become operative, subsumes that a salvage certificate or

branded title has been issued so whether or not any of the Defendants may be or may not
be sellers becomes moot in that the pleadings of Plaintiff and the deposition in this case
discloses that no such title was issued or procured; (see deposition of James G. Holmes Page
93 , Line 24,) In view of the clear wording of the statute relied on by Plaintiff any claim
based on that statute must be denied. In K&T, Inc. v. KOROULIS 888 P2d 623, 627 (Utah
1994) the court held that each term in a statute was '"used advisedly; thus the statutory
words are read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable.".
32.

41-la-1005 provides in pertinent part that "if an insurance Co. Declares a

vehicle a salvage vehicle and takes possession of the vehicle for disposal..." In this case,

See Addendum A for full text
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neither of the Insurance Company's involved, they being Defendants American States and
Clarendon National respectively, declared the 1994 Hummer to be a salvage vehicle (see
affidavit of Charles Fullmer ) nor did either of the Defendant insurance companies take
Possession of the motor vehicle for disposal (see affidavit of Charlie Fullmer). Since neither
of the two conditions precedent occurred the Plaintiff enjoys no rights under section 1005.
33.

41-la-1001 defined salvage vehicle as "[any vehicle][that] is:
a) damaged by collision, flood, or other occurrence to the extent that
the cost of repairing the vehicle for safe operation exceeds its fair
market value; or b) that has been declared a salvage vehicle by an
insurer of other state or jurisdiction, but is not precluded from further
registration and titling.

34.

In this case the motor vehicle in question had not been declared a salvage

vehicle by the an insurer of another State or Jurisdiction, nor had the motor vehicle been
damaged to the extent that the cost of repair exceeded the fair market value; see deposition
of James Gordon Holmes P.47 Line 14; the cost of repair approximating $8,500.00 while the
fair market value as repaired exceeds $35,000.00. (See deposition of J.G. Holmes, P48, Line
5 and affidavit of Charles Fullmer). As the undisputed facts establish, Mr. Fullmer offered
the vehicle to Plaintiff for $17,000 making the cost to the Plaintiff, with repairs $25,000.00.
What Plaintiff later elected to pay becomes immaterial, it is apparent that Plaintiff having
approached the Insurance company first, might well have obtained the vehicle for the initial
purchase price, that being $12,000.00. See affidavit of C. Fullmer.
35.

The fact is, the motor vehicle in question was not salvage and no proof of that

fact exists. All of the Statutes adopted by Plaintiff are predicated on the 1994 Hummer
being a "salvage vehicle" and there being no proof of that fact Plaintiff's entire case falls in
of it's own weight and is subject to summary disposition under Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 56.
36.

Plaintiff points to the alleged assumption of a member of the clerical staff at

American States Insurance Company that someone should have surrendered the title to the
8

State for a salvage designation. Conclusory statements are not admissible and will not serve
to establish a controverting fact. Western Thrift and Loan v. Bloomquist 29 Ut 2.d 274, 504
P2.d 1019 (1972).
37.

Likewise the Affidavit of Danny Jensen relied on by Plaintiff/Appellant is not

based on personal knowledge and inspection but is based on heresay reports prepared by
others. Again, such assertions are not admissible as evidence upon which the court might
base a finding of fact. Treloqqan v. Treloggan 699 P2.d 747 (Utah 1985).
38.

Plaintiff presses other points whereby Plaintiff would have the Court consider

and give weight to the conclusory acts of others, such as an unknown person making a
notation on an invoice or an unknown person on the telephone making a statement of fact
concerning the salvage nature of the motor vehicle utilizing information gleaned from an
unknown source.
The prior 3 paragraphs summarize Plaintiff's proof as to the salvage nature of the
subject motor vehicle, from this perspective alone we are left with nothing to controvert the
Affidavit of Charlie Fullmer the Affidavit of the employee of American General and/or the
undeniable mathematical truth drawn from figures given in the depositions of Plaintiff.
II.

May the Plaintiff, under the facts of this case, prove damages in the absence

of issuance of a salvage title?
39.

There is no cited case known to Defendant where recovery has been allowed

(or even sought) for non-designation as salvage of an un-repaired vehicle unless there has
been active concealment of a latent defect.
40.

The fact that an insurance company pays an insured a sum of money and takes

possession of an insured vehicle does not ipso facto create a salvage vehicle. Christensen
was paid the cash value of his vehicle prior to the damage; this does not mean that the
vehicle was salvage it just means that the Insurance company, at it's election, paid in accord
9

with what was deemed to be it's contractual obligation. The insurer then transferred it's
interest in the damaged vehicle for the best price obtainable, not necessarily the salvage
price. It is apparent from the prices paid by various dealers or the acts of Plaintiff that the
motor vehicle was thought to have considerable worth and utility despite the damage it had
sustained.
41.

While it is possible that issuance of a salvage title might well decrease the

value of a motor vehicle for resale, the notation on the title could not conceivable affect the
intrinsic value or utility of the motor vehicle. (See affidavit of Charlie Fullmer.) Likewise
if the vehicle has a "clean title" how can that fact adversely affect its worth?
42.

Plaintiff admittedly purchased the vehicle with full knowledge of the damage

and made the purchase for his own use and after accomplishing the contemplated repairs
he did, until the sale in November of 1998, use the motor vehicle for all of the uses he
originally contemplated at the time of purchase. The value of the motor vehicle to Plaintiff
could not be enhanced by the act of placing a salvage notation on the title.
POINT III.

Respecting the facts of this case the Consumer Sales Practices Act and the

Uniform Commercial Code do not control the transaction in question?
43.

Respecting the consumer sales practices act, UCA 13-11-1 et. Seq., Even if we

assume Defendants are suppliers and Plaintiff is a consumer, which the defendants do not
assume and do vigorously deny, these statutes have no application to the facts of the case.
44.

UCA 13-11-4 and 13-11-5 define the prohibited conduct and are attached

hereto as part of the Addendum A and it is thereby apparent that the claims of Plaintiff lie
without the prohibitions of that legislation.
45.

In the recent case of WOODHAVEN v. WASHINGTON 907 P2d 271 (Ut. Ct.

App. 1995) Rvsd on 22 July, 1997 the Court addressed the unconscionability provisions of
the act and the Court observed, with respect to a claim for damages, that to be
10

unconscionable the circumstances must be such as to be oppressive and to unfairly surprise
the claimant. Nothing alleged or pleaded by the Plaintiff even addresses this standard, let
alone approaches the burden the standard imposes.
46.

It is said that to be an actionable deceptive practice the practice must A) be

a deceptive act or practice as defined by UCA 13-11-4 ; B) and must be done intentionally
by the Defendant contemplating that Plaintiff will rely on the deception and C) the
deception must occur in a course of conduct involving trade or commerce. In this case it
cannot be denied, and the trial court so found, that the Plaintiff was, at the time he acquired
title to the vehicle, better informed than any party to this transaction, at any time, as to the
true condition of the motor vehicle. P.24 Line 1-18 (Deposition of Plaintiff Holmes taken
on April 7, 1997).
47.

Reference to UCA 70A could well complicate Plaintiff's claims further when

one looks 70A-2-1044 as to "transactions between merchants";5 Other than the implications
of that section it is difficult to find where the UCC creates or provides a cause of action
based on failure to procure a "salvage title".
48.

Contrary to assertions by Plaintiff, no named Defendant can be said to have

any fiduciary relationship with Defendant, whether it be created by statute or by case law
and it is further apparent that Defendant is not now nor has he ever been under any
disability or nor can it be said that Plaintiff occupied a legally disadvantaged position; how
then does the Plaintiff claim Defendant's have a fiduciary duty?

See Addendum for full text
See Addendum for full text

li

CONCLUSION
the most important single fact disclosed during the trial proceedings was that none
of the transferees of the interest of Christensen treated the subject vehicle as salvage but
only as a vehicle which was in need of limited repair to become fully functional. That fact
coupled with the legal infirmities of the Plaintiff's position compelled a finding by the Trial
Court that the subject vehicle was not a salvage vehicle.
Since there were no actual damages, any damages must be predicated on the statute
and since no violation of any statute has occurred Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which
a recovery might be had.

Respectfully Submitted,

/

r
A. W. Lauritzen
Attorney for Defendants Economy Auto Inc.
& Clarendon National Insurance Company
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of
Appellees postage prepaid, to the following listed below on this
Day of
, 1999.

Paul M. Belnap
Attorney for American States Insurance Company
6th Floor Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Ray G. Martineau
Anthony R. Martineau
Attorneys for Plaintiff James Gordon Holmes
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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Appeals

ADDENDUM

A

ADDENDUM A
STATUTES DETERMINATIVE AND OF CENTRAL
IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL:
Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act:
13-11-2.

Construction and purposes of act.

This act shall be construed liberally to promote the following policies:
(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing consumer
sales practices;
(2) to protect consumers from suppliers who commit deceptive and
unconscionable sales practices;
(3) to encourage the development of fair consumer sales practices;
(4) to make state regulation of consumer sales practices not
inconsistent with the policies of the Federal Trade Commission Act relating
to consumer protection;
(5) to make uniform the law, including the administrative rules, with
respect to the subject of this act among those states which enact similar
laws; and
(6) to recognize and protect suppliers who in good faith comply
with the provisions of this act.
13-11-3.

Definitions.

(2) "Consumer transaction" means a sale, lease, assignment, award
by chance, or other written or oral transfer or disposition of goods, services, or
other property, both tangible and intangible (except securities and insurance), to
a person for primarily personal, family, or household purposes, or for purposes
that relate to a business opportunity that requires both his expenditure of money
or property and his personal services on a continuing basis and in which he has
not been previously engaged, or a solicitation or offer by a supplier with respect
to any of these transfers or dispositions. It includes any offer or solicitation, any
agreement, any performance of an agreement with respect to any of these
transfers or dispositions, and any charitable solicitation as defined in this section.
(5) "Person" means an individual, corporation, government,
governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership,
association, cooperative, or any other legal entity.
(6) "Supplier" means a seller, lessor, assignor, offeror, broker, or
other person who regularly solicits, engages in, or enforces consumer transactions,
whether or not he deals directly with the consumer.

1

13-11-4.

Deceptive act or practice by supplier.

(1) A deceptive act or practice by a supplier in connection with a consumer
transaction violates this chapter whether it occurs before, during, or after the
transaction.
(2) Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), a supplier commits a
deceptive act or practice if the supplier knowingly or intentionally:
(a) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has sponsorship,
approval, performance characteristics, accessories, uses, or benefits, if it
has not;
(b) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is of a particular
standard, quality, grade, style, or model, if it is not;
(c) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is new, or unused,
if it is not, or has been used to an extent that is materially different from the
fact;
(e) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has been supplied
in accordance with a previous representation, if it has not;
(j) indicates that a consumer transaction involves or does not involve a
warranty, a disclaimer of warranties, particular warranty terms, or other
rights, remedies, or obligations, if the representation is false;
13-11-5.

Unconscionable act or practice by supplier.

(1) An unconscionable act or practice by a supplier in connection with a
consumer transaction violates this act whether it occurs before, during, or after the
transaction.
(2) The unconscionability of an act or practice is a question of law for the
court. If it is claimed or appears to the court that an act or practice may be
unconscionable, the parties shall be given a reasonable opportunity to present
evidence as to its setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in making its
determination.
(3) In determining whether an act or practice is unconscionable, the court
shall consider circumstances which the supplier knew or had reason to know.
13-11-19.

Actions by consumer.

(1) Whether he seeks or is entitled to damages or otherwise has an
adequate remedy at law, a consumer may bring an action to:
(a) obtain a declaratory judgment that an act or practice violates this
chapter; and
(b) enjoin, in accordance with the principles of equity, a supplier who has
violated, is violating, or is likely to violate this chapter.
2

(2) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a violation of this chapter
may recover, but not in a class action, actual damage or $2,000, whichever is
greater, plus court costs.
(5) Except for services performed by the enforcing authority, the court may
award to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee limited to the work
reasonably performed if:
(a) the consumer complaining of the act or practice that violates this
chapter has brought or maintained an action he knew to be groundless; or a
supplier has committed an act or practice that violates this chapter; and
(b) an action under this section has been terminated by a judgment or
required by the court to be settled under Subsection 13-1 l-21(l)(a).
13-11-23.
act.

Other remedies available—Class action only as prescribed by

The remedies of this act are in addition to remedies otherwise available for
the same conduct under state or local law, except that a class action relating to a
transaction governed by this act may be brought only as prescribed by this act.
Utah Motor Vehicle Dealer Act:
41-la-1001.

Definitions

(6) "Salvage vehicle" means any vehicle:
(a) damaged by collision, flood, or other occurrence to the extent
that the cost of repairing the vehicle for safe operation exceeds its fair
market value; or
41-la-1004.

Certificate of title - Salvage vehicles

(2) Before the sale of a vehicle for which a salvage certificate or branded
title has been issued, the seller shall provide the prospective purchaser with written
notification that a salvage certificate or a branded title has been issued for the
vehicle.
41-la-1005. Salvage vehicle - Declaration by insurance company Surrender of title - Salvage certificate of title.
(1) (a) (i) If an insurance company declares a vehicle a salvage vehicle
and takes possession of the vehicle for disposal, or an insurance
company pays off the owner of a vehicle that is stolen and not
recovered, the insurance company shall within tern days from the
settlement of the loss surrender to the division the outstanding
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certificate of title, properly endorsed, or other evidence of
ownership acceptable to the division,
(d) (i) If a dealer licensed under Title 41, Chapter 3, Part 2, Licensing,
takes possession of any salvage vehicle for which there is not
already issued a branded title or salvage certificate from the
division or another jurisdiction, the dealer shall within ten days
surrender to the division the certificate of title or other evidence of
ownership acceptable to the division,
(ii) The division shall then issue a salvage certificate in the
applicant's name.
(2) Any person, insurance company, or dealer licensed under Title 41,
Chapter 3, Part 2, Licensing, who fails to obtain a salvage certificate as required in
this section or who sells a salvage vehicle without first obtaining a salvage
certificate is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
41-la-1008.

Criminal penalty for violation.

It is a class A misdemeanor to knowingly violate Sections 41-1 a-1001
through 41-la-1007, unless another penalty is specifically provided.
41-3-205.

Licenses—Bonds required—Maximum liability—Action against
surety—
(1) (a) Before a dealer's, special equipment dealer's, crusher's, or body
shop's license is issued the applicant shall file with the administrator a
corporate surety bond in the amount of:
(i) $20,000 for a motor vehicle dealer's license or special
equipment dealer's license;
(ii) $1,000 for a motorcycle or small trailer dealer's or crusher's
license; or
(iii) $10,000 for a body shop's license.
(b) The corporate surety shall be licensed 10 do business within the
state.
(c) The form of the bond:
(i) shall be approved by the attorney general;
(ii) shall be conditioned upon the applicant's conducting business
as a dealer without fraud or fraudulent representation and without
violating this chapter; and
(iii) may be continuous in form.
(d) The total aggregate annual liability on the bond to all persons
making claims may not exceed the amount of the bond.
(2) A cause of action under Subsection (1) may not be maintained
against a surety unless:

(a) a claim is filed in writing with the administrator within one year
after the cause of action arose; and
(b) the action is commenced within two years after the claim was
filed with the administrator.
(3) A person making a claim on the bond shall be awarded attorneys' fees
in cases successfully prosecuted or settled against the surety or principal if the
bond has not been depleted.
41-3-210. License holders—Prohibitions.
(1) The holder of any license issued under this chapter may not:
(c) violate this chapter or the rules made by the administrator;
(d) violate any law of the state respecting commerce in motor
vehicles of any rule respecting commerce in motor vehicles made by
any licensing or regulating authority of the state.
41-3-404. Right of action against dealer, salesperson, crusher, body shop, or
surety on bond.
(1) A person may maintain an action against a dealer, crusher, or body ship
on the corporate surety bond if:
(a) the person suffers a loss or damage because of:
(i) fraud;
(ii) fraudulent representation; or
(iii) a violation of:
(A) this chapter;
(B) any law respecting commerce in motor vehicles; or
(C) a rule respecting commerce in motor vehicle made by a
licensing
or regulating authority; and
(b) the loss or damage results from the action of:
(i) a licensed dealer;
(ii) a licensed dealer's salesperson action on behalf of the dealer or
within the scope of the salesperson's employment;
(iii) a licensed crusher; or
(iv) a body shop.
(2) Successive recovery against a surety on a bond is permitted, but the
total aggregate annual liability on the bond to all persons making claims may not
exceed the amount of the bond.
(3) A cause of action may not be maintained against any surety under any
bond required under this chapter except as provided in Section 41-3-205.
41-3-701. Violations as misdemeanors.

5

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter any person who violates
this chapter or any rule made by the administrator is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
(2) A person who violates Section 41-3-201 is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
(3) A person who violates Section 41-3-301 is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor unless the selling dealer complies with the requirements of Section
41-3-403.
41-3-702, Civil penalty for violation.
(3) The following are civil violations in addition to criminal violations
under Section 41-la-1008:
(a) knowingly selling a salvage vehicle, as defined in Section 41-1 a1001, without disclosing that the salvage vehicle has been repaired or
rebuilt;
(b) knowingly making a false statement on a vehicle damage disclosure
statement, as defiled in Section 41-1 a-1001; or
(c) fraudulently certifying that a damaged motor vehicle is entitled to
an unbranded title, as defined in Section 41-1 a-1001, when it is not.
(4) The civil penalty for a violation under Subsection (1) is:
(a) not less than $1,000, or treble the actual damages caused by the
person, whichever is greater; and
(b) reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of the action.
(5) A civil action may be maintained by a purchaser or by the
administrator.
Utah Administrative Code R873-22M-25 states:
A.
The Motor Vehicle Division shall brand a vehicle's title if, at
the time of initial registration or transfer or ownership, evidence exists
that the vehicle is a salvage vehicle.
B.
Written
that a vehicle has been issued a salvage
certificate or branded title shall be made to a prospective purchaser on
a form approved by the Administrator of the Motor Vehicle
Enforcement Division.
C.
The form must clearly and conspicuously disclose that the
vehicle has been issued a salvage certificate or branded title.
D.
The form must be presented to and signed by the prospective
purchaser and the prospective lien holder, if any, prior to the sale of
the vehicle.
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E.
If the seller of the vehicle is a dealer, the form must be
prominently displayed in the lower passenger-side comer of the
windshield for the period of time the vehicle is on display for sale.
F.
The original disclosure form shall be given to the purchaser
and a copy shall be given to the new lienholder, if any. A copy shall
be kept on file by the seller for a period of three years from the date of
sale if the seller is a dealer..)
Utah Uniform Commercial Code:
70A-1-102. Purposes—Rules of construction—Variation by agreement.
(1) This act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its
underlying purposes and policies.
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this act are
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through
custom, usage and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
(3) The effect of provisions of this act may be varied by agreement, except
as otherwise provided in this act and except that the obligations of good faith,
diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this act may not be disclaimed by
agreement but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the
performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not
manifestly unreasonable.
(4) The presence in certain provisions of this act of the words "unless
otherwise agreed" or words of similar import does not imply that the effect of
other provisions may not be varied by agreement under Subsection (3).
(5) In this act unless the context otherwise requires
(a) words in the singular number include the plural, and in the plural
include the singular;
(b) words of the masculine gender include the feminine and the
neuter, and when the sense so indicates words of the neuter gender may
refer to any gender.
70A-1-103. Supplementary general principles of law applicable.
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this act, the principles of
law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to
contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion,
mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its
provisions.
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70A-1-106. Remedies to be liberally administered.
(1) The remedies provided by this act shall be liberally administered to the
end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party
had fully performed but neither consequential or special nor penal damages may
be had except as specifically provided in this act or by other rule of law.
(2) Any right or obligation declared by this act is enforceable by action
unless the provision declaring it specifies a different and limited effect.
70A-1-201. General definitions.
(3) "Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in
their language or by implication from other circumstances including course
of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance as provided in
Sections 70A-1-205 and 70A-2-208. Whether an agreement has legal
consequences is determined by the provisions of this title, if applicable;
otherwise by the law of contracts as provided in Section 70A-1-103.
Compare the definition of "contract" in Subsection (11).
(11) "Contract" means the total legal obligation which results from
the parties' agreement as affected by this title and any other applicable rules
of law. Compare the definition of "agreement" in Subsection (3).
(15) "Document of title" includes bill of lading, dock warrant, dock
receipt, warehouse receipt, or order for the delivery of goods, and also any
other document which in the regular course of business or financing is
treated as adequately representing that the person in possession of it is
entitled to receive, hold and dispose of the document and the goods it
covers. To be a document of title, a document must purport to be issued by
oraddressed to a bailee and purport to cover goods in the bailee's
possession which are either identified or are fungible portions of an
identified mass.
09) "Good faith" means honesty in fart in the conduct or
transaction concerned.
70A-1-203. Obligation of good faith.
Every contract or duty within this act imposes an obligation of good faith in
its performance or enforcement.
70A-2-103. Definitions and index of definitions.
(1) In this chapter unless the context otherwise requires
(a) "Buyer" means a person who buys or contracts to buy goods.
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(b) "Good faith" in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in
the trade.
(d) "Seller" means a person who sells or contracts to sell goods.
70A-2-104. Definitions—"Merchant"- " Between merchants'5- "Financing
agency."
(1) "Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or
otherwise by hib occupation hold* himself out as having knowledge or skill
peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such
knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or
oihci iinciinediary who by his occupation holds himself uul a* having such
knowledge or skill.
(2) "Financing agency" means a bank, finance company or other person
who in the ordinary course of business makes advances against goods or
documents of title or who by arrangement with either the seller or the buyer
intervenes in ordinary course to make or collect payment due or claimed under the
contract for sale, as by purchasing or paying the seller's draft or making advances
against it or by merely taking it for collection whether or not documents of title
accompany the draft. Financing agency" includes also a bank or other person who
similarly intervenes between persons who are in the position of seller and buyer in
respect to the goods (Section 701-2-707).
(3) "Between merchants" means in any transaction with respect to which
both parties are chargeable with the knowledge or skill of merchants.
70A-2-105. Definitions—"Goods"
(1) "Goods" means all things (including specially manufactured goods)
which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than
the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (chapter 8) and
things in action.
(2) Goods must be both existing and identified before any interest in them
can pass. Goods which are not both existing and identified are "future" goods. A
purported present sale of future goods or of any interest therein operates as a
contract to sell.
(3) There may be a sale of a part interest in existing identified goods.
70A-2-106. Definitions—"Contract"—"Agreement"—"Contract for sale"—
"Sale"—"Present sale"—"Conforming" to contract—
"Termination"-"Cancellation."
(1) In this chapter unless the context otherwise requires "contract" and
"agreement" are limited to those relating to the present or future sale of goods.
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"Contract for sale" includes both a present sale of goods and a contract to sell
goods at a future time. A "sale" consists in the passing of title from the seller to
the buyer for a price (Section 70A-2-401). A "present sale" means a sale which is
accomplished by the making of the contract.
(2) Goods or conduct including any part of a performance are
"conforming" or conform to the contract when they are in accordance with the
obligations under the contract.
(3) "Termination" occurs when either party pursuant to a power created by
agreement or law puts an end to the contract otherwise than for its breach. On
"termination" all obligations which are still executory on both sides are discharged
but any right based on prior breach or performance survives.
(4) "Cancellation" occurs when either party puts an end to the contract for
breach by the other and its effect is the same as that of "termination" except that
the canceling party also retains any remedy for breach of the whole contract or any
unperformed balance.
70A-2-302. Unconscionable contract or clause.
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse
to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to
aid the court in making the determination.
70A-2-312. Warranty of title and against infringement - Buyer's obligation
against infringement.
(2) A warranty under Subsection (1) will be excluded or modified only by
specific language or by circumstances which give the buyer reason to know that
the person selling does not claim title in himself or that he is purporting to sell
only such right or title as he or a third person may have.
70A-2-313. Express warranties by affirmation, promise, description, sample.
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the

bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of
the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to
the description.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller
use formal words such as "warrantor "guarantee" or that he have a specific
intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods
or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the
goods does not create a v/arranty.
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PER CURIAM:
rraham L. TRELOGGAN and Joyce S.
Treloggan, Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
Curtis L. TRELOGGAN and Julie A.
Treloggan, and D & C Builders,
Defendants and Appellants.
No. 19954.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 5, 1985.
Mortgagees brought action to foreclose on mortgage, and holder of judgment
lien intervened. The Second District Court,
Weber County, David E. Roth, J., granted
mortgagees' motion for summary judgment, and holder of judgment lien appealed. The Supreme Court held that affidavits on information and belief filed by holder of judgment lien revealed no evidentiary
facts, but merely reflected affiant's unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions, and
thus were insufficient to raise issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.
Affirmed.
1. Judgment <3=>185.1(3)
Under summary judgment rule, an affidavit on information and belief is insufficient to provoke genuine issue of fact.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(e).
2. Judgment <s=>185.3(15)
In action brought by mortgagees to
foreclose on mortgage, affidavits on information and belief filed by intervening holder of judgment lien revealed no evidentiary
facts, but merely reflected affiant's unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions, and
th^c '..^rc ;rwUff.':':"t to raise issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(e).
Horace J. Knowlton, Salt Lake City, for
defendants and appellants.
James R. Hasenyager, Ogden, for plaintiffs and respondents.

This is an appeal from an order of the
district court granting respondents' motion
for summary judgment and dismissing appellant's complaint in intervention and subsequent amended complaints.
Respondents are the parents of defendant Curtis Treloggan. On February 12,
1979, Curtis and Julie Treloggan, his wife,
borrowed $15,000 from respondents. A
promissory note was signed which provided
that the principal and interest (at 10% per
annum) would be paid on or before February 2, 1980. To secure performance on the
note, respondents took a mortgage on real
property located in Weber County. The
mortgage was recorded on February 13,
1979.
On March 1, 1979, appellant D & C Builders obtained a judgment against Curtis and
Julie Treloggan for money due on an open
account. Subsequently, it filed a judgment
lien against the Weber County property.
When the promissory note was not paid
within the time allotted, respondents filed a
complaint to foreclose ^n the mortgage. In
personal correspondence with the district
court, Curtis and Julie Treloggan conceded
default on the debt. D & C Builders filed
an answer and counterclaim wherein it alleged that the conveyance to respondents
was void, praying that it be declared the
first lienholder. On June 16, 1980, the
district court granted respondents summary judgment of foreclosure against Curtis
and Julie Treloggan and ordered that appellant's interests be tried on its counterclaim.
Further proceedings against the property
were stayed when Curtis and Julie Treloggan filed for bankruptcy and the trustee in
oanKrupic> a ^ u i ^ J control of the property. When the property could not be sold
for any amount greater than respondents'
interest, the trustee abandoned the property in January 1984.
On February 22, 19? \ respondents filed
a motion for summarv iudgment dismissing
D & C Builders' complaint in intervention
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and amended complaint. Respondents asserted that they were entitled to judgment
as a matter of law since there was no
genuine issue as to material fact. Respondents' motion was supported by affidavits
and other documents establishing that the
$15,000 was in fact paid by respondents to
their son and daughter-in-law in a purely
arm's length transaction. In response, D
& C Builders filed affidavits of its office
manager alleging, upon information and
belief, that the note and mortgage had
been given to defraud D & C Builders and
to frustrate collection of its indebtedness.
A hearing was held, and the trial court
granted respondents' motion for summary
judgment. The basis of the court's order
was that respondents had established by
affidavit that they had made a loan to
Curtis and Julie Treloggan and that D & C
Builders had failed to establish "by way of
rebutting affidavits or other admissible evidence" either that the loan was not made
or that it was made to defraud D & C
Builders. On appeal, D & C Builders challenges that decision.
[1] Under Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e), an affidavit on information and belief is insufficient to provoke a genuine issue of fact.
In Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation
Corp., 29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973),
we held that an opposing affidavit under
Rule 56(e):
[M]ust be made on personal knowledge
of the affiant, and set forth facts that
would be admissible in evidence and
show that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein.
Statements made merely on information
and belief will be disregarded.
In Joiits v. Hinkie, Utan, bll P.2d 733
(1980), we cited Walker with approval and
stated that when a motion for summary
judgment is made under the Rule, "the
affidavit of an adverse party must contain
specific evidentiary facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial." We held
that plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law, defendants having failed to
identify with specificity any material fact.

[2] Appellant's affidavits in the instant
case are deficient for the same reasons.
The affidavits reveal no evidentiary facts,
but merely reflect the affiant's unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions in regard to
the transactions concerned.
The summary judgment is therefore affirmed. Costs to respondents.
STEWART, J., does not participate herein.
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Cite as 907 P.2d 271 (UtahApp. 1995)

WOODHAVEN APARTMENTS,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Bertha WASHINGTON, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 940233-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 30, 1995.
Landlord sought award of liquidated
damages after tenant vacated apartment six
months before lease term ended. The Third
Circuit, West Valley Department, William A.
Thome, J., found for landlord. Tenant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Wilkins, J.,
held that: (1) liquidated damages provision
was enforceable, and (2) provision wras not
unconscionable.
Affirmed.
Orme, P.J., dissented and filed opinion.
1. Appeal and Error <3=>1008.1(1)
Court of Appeals gives deference to trial
court's findings of fact.
2. Appeal and Error <s*842(2)
Court of Appeals reviews trial court's
conclusions of law for correctness.
3. Damages <S=*78(6)
Liquidated damage clause in lease,
which assessed a fee of one and one-half
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months rent if tenant vacated premises prematurely but apartment was re-rented before
expiration of lease, was enforceable, since it
was a reasonable forecast of harm caused if
tenant vacated early, and harm was difficult
for parties to estimate when lease agreement
was signed.
4. Damages <s=*80(3)
While reasonable correlation must exist
between damages landlord actually incurs
from tenant's breach of lease and liquidated
damages provided for in lease, liquidated
damages provision will only be declared void
if any disparity between damages landlord
incurred and those provided for in lease is
grossly excessive and shocks the conscience.
5. Damages ^^76
Under basic principles of freedom of
contract, stipulation to liquidated damages
for breach of contract is generally enforceable.
6. Contracts C=»l
Parties may enter into contracts that
later appear to be unfair or unreasonable,
and may contract at arms length without
intervention of courts to rescue one side from
result of that bargain.
7. Consumer Protection <£=>8
Although favorable to landlord, liquidated damages clause in apartment lease was
not unconscionable under Utah Consumer
Sales Practi es Art (UCSPA). U.C.A.1953,
13-11-1 et seq.
8. Damages <^78(6)
In breach of lease situation, landlord is
not prohibited from collecting liquidated
damages instead of itemizing actual damages.

Pr"r>o Plenk and Eric Mittelstadt, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant.
1. The lease provision reads in whole:
2o. Should Resident \acate the premises prior to the c\pu ation of the terms, Resident will
be held responsible for the term ot tne leai>e.
In the event that the apartment re-rents prior
to the expiration of lease, Resident will be
assessed a termination fee equal to one and
one-half months[ ] rent

James H. Deans, Salt Lake City, for ArJ
pellee.
Before ORME, GREENWOOD and
WILKINS, JJ.
OPINION
WILKINS, Judge:

•4

^
-t|

Bertha Washington appeals the lower;
court's decision to grant Woodhaven Apart-11
ments liquidated damages as a part of itsv
judgment against her. We affirm.
-is

BACKGROUND

-3

i
Woodhaven brought this action againsfi
Washington for damages pursuant to their^
lease agreement after Washington vacated'
the apartment six months before the leasf!
term ended. Paragraph 26 of the lease!
agreement, which appeared immediately*
above the signature line, provided that if;
Washington vacated the premises before the1
lease expired, she would be assessed a "ter-^
mination fee equal to one and one-halft
monthsf] rent" if the apartment was re-lei^
before the lease expired.1 Because Woodhal
ven re-let Washington's apartment only fif-l
teen days after she vacated it, Washington,
appeals the lower court's finding that the
liquidated damages fee was enforceable and*
the court's conclusion that contracting for thej
fee was not an unconscionable act under the'
Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (UCS-J
PA).2 Washington also argues that Utah lawl
preh;v";s landlords fr^m receiving liquidated^
damages awards.
Z
STANDARD OF REVIEW
\%
[1.2] We have given deference to theg
trial court's findings of fact, see Reliance In$£
Co. v. Utah Deft of Transp., 8b8 P.2d I363g
1367 (Utah 1993), but we have revised fig*
correctness the trial court's conclusions that!
the liquidated damages were not unconscitH*
2.

On appeal, neither party disputes the tnalj;
court's determination that the contested l e a ^
provision is a liquidated damages clause or that!
the UCSPA applies Consequently, u c do no9j
address these conclusions.
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tnd that landlords may receive liquilamages for a tenant's breach of a
Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-5(2) (1992);
emlkj State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936
L994).
ANALYSIS
I.
Wre hold that the liquidated damages
n Washington's lease with Woodhaven
under Utah law. Because it was a
ible forecast of the harm caused if
gton vacated early, and the harm was
, for the parties to estimate when the
- : J , -' ? liquid:- 1
•s provision is enforceable. See Reliis. Co. v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 858
*63, 1367 (Utah 1993) (adopting Re>nt of Contracts § 339 (1932)).
A reasonable correlation must exist
a the damages Woodhaven actually
d and those provided for in the conic! Any disparity between the damoodhaven incurred and those provided
le liquidated damages provision "must
issly excessive' and must 'shock the
rice' of this court before we declare
uidated damages void." Id. (citing
i Kingdon, 723 P.2d 394, 397 (Utah
see Young Elec. Sign Co. v. tyiited
rd West, Inc., 755 P.2d 162, 164 (Utah
noting that liquidated damages "are
able if the amount of liquidated damp e d to is not disproportionate to the
i compensatory damages and does not
ite a forfeiture or a penalty''). The
)urt found, and we agree, that the
ed damages provision "does not shock
science as being unfair or oppressive."
iddition, the record indicates that
iven incurs extra costs and expenses
tenant terminates a lease early. For
B, Woodhaven must perform additionIUJJU aiive work such as ensuring that
aning and repairs are timely done,
sing for the vacancy, showing the
ent to prospective tenants, evaluating
dit worthiness of prospective tenants,
paring paperwork for the prospective
• As the trial court found, an ^ssess" one and one-half months' rent is not

out of proportion to the effort and resources
required to re-let the apartment. The early
termination assessment agreed to by the parties was reasonable in light of the thenanticipated expenses expected to be caused
by Washington's possible early termination.
The harm caused by Washington's breach
was also difficult to accurately estimate when
the parties contracted, so the second part of
the legal test to determine the validity of
liquidated damages is also met in this case.
See Reliance Ins., 858 P.2d at 1368-70. The
parties' lease was for one year. Neither
Woodhaven nor Washington could know
what the housing market would be uKe during the coming year. Particularly, they
could not know how long it would take
Woodhaven to re-let Washington's apartment
if she vacated before the lease ended.
Therefore, since both prongs of the legal
test are met, the liquidated damages provision is valid. First, the liquidated damages
clause was a reasonable forecast, at the time
the lease was entered into, of the damages
Woodhaven would incur if Washington terminated her lease early. Second, the harm was
difficult for the parties to accurately estimate
when the lease agreement was signed.
[5] Furthermore, "'[ujnder the basic
principles of freedom of contract, a stipulation to liquidated damages for breach of contract is generally enforceable.'" Allen, 723
P.2d at 397 (quoting Warner v. Rasmussen,
704 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah 1985) (citations omitted)). It is reasonable that Woodhaven,
which is comprised of 378 apartments, should
be allowed to minimize its accounting costs of
re-letting apartments that have been vacated
early rather than requiring it to keep exacting accounting records of individualized costs
for each breach by a tenant of a lease agreement. Using a liquidation clause also benefits tenants because they know what cost will
be assessed upon early vacancy. If actual
costs were the only allowed measure of damages, some tenants would be required to pay
more than the liquidated damages assessment if the landlord was unable to re-let the
vacated apartment for several months de-

274 Utah

907 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

spite significant and potentially expensive efforts to the contrary.

for a Utah landlord in a breach of lea$£
situation.

II.
We also affirm the trial court's legal conclusion that paragraph 26 was not unconscionable despite Washington's argument that
she lacked a meaningful choice regarding the
liquidated damages clause. "Unconscionable," according to our supreme court, "is a
term that defies precise definition. Rather, a
court must assess the circumstances of each
particular case in light of the twofold purpose
oi the doctrine, pre\ eniion ui oppression and
of unfair surprise.'' Resource Management
Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co.. 706
P.2d 1028, 1041 (Utah 1985).

CONCLUSION

[6] Washington here claims oppression,
rather than unfair surprise as the basis for
finding paragraph 26 to be unconscionable.
However, it is still the law in Utah that
parties may contract at arms length without
the intervention of the courts to rescue one
side or the other from the result of that
bargain. Id. at 1040. Parties are permitted
to enter into contracts that later appear to be
unfair or um-easonable. Id. "Although
courts will not be parties to enforcing flagrantly unjust agreements, it is not for the
courts to assume the paternalistic role of
declaring that one wrho has freely bound himself need not perform because the bargain is
not favorable." Bekins Bar V Ranch v.
Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah 19S3).
[7] Having considered all the surrounding circumstances in this case, the "trial
court did not find this contract to be unconscionable, and there is no basis upon which
we can say, as a matter of law, that he erred
in his conclusion." Jacobson v. Sivan, 3 Utah
2d 59, 67, 278 P.2d 294, 300 (1954).
III.
[8] Washington's argument that Utah law
prohibits landlords from collecting liquidated
damages awards has no ment. The trial
court correctly concluded that Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co, 776 P.2d 896
(Utah 1989), does not require the itemization
of actual damages as the exclusive remedy

The liquidated damages provision of para!
graph 26 bore a reasonable relationship tol
the damage the parties anticipated Woodhal
ven would incur if Washington terminated!
her lease early, and the harm was difficult tol
accurately estimate at the time the leasej
agreement was signed. In addition, thj
damages were not unconscionable under theP
UCSPA, and they are allowed under Utafil
law. We affirm. Cobts and atturney fee&
are awarded to Woodhaven.
GREENWOOD, J., concurs.
ORME, Presiding Judge (dissenting).
I dissent. In this case, the landlord rej
ceived, as part of its judgment, the amount b|
rent that was owed but not paid by the?
tenant right up to the time the apartment
was relet. In addition, the trial court stood,
ready to awTard additional actual damages to*
compensate for property damage caused byj
the tenant, but found no such damage wasj
proven by the landlord. Also, the lease pro^
vides that a portion of the money paid by thej
tenant in advance is not refundable, but rath^j
er is earmarked for redecoration.
p>|
If the tenant remains contractually liable*'
for actual rent unpaid up to the time ofj
reletting, for the costs necessary to repair]
any property damage, and for at least somV
redecoration, wThat kind of damage is sought;
to be covered by over $500 in additional
liquidated damages? The trial court theo|
rized that a landlord incurs other expense™
like running ads and posting signs to adver-^
tise the vacancy, and that time must be speniE
in showing the unit to prospective tenant^
and processing applications. Howrever, the;
landlord's employee testified the real purposejj
for the provision was to induce the tenant _t0j
honor the lease obligations and the landlord^
attorney freely referred to it as a provision^
to "penalize the tenant for not keeping the]
ie*?e" Significantly, the landlord suffered*
no demonstrated additional damage in this*
case.
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•e are a number of bases upon which
can invalidate liquidated damages prowhich work such unjust results. One
if the "party who would avoid a liquidamages provision" proves "no damrere suffered or that there is no reaB relationship between compensatory
[ddated damages." Young Elec. Sign
United Standard West, Inc., 755 P.2d
64 (Utah 1988). See also Allen v.
on, 123 P.2d 394, 397 (Utah 1986)
ig $10,800 "excessive and dispropor>" when compared to actual loss of
and refusing to enforce liquidated
es provision); Young Elec. Sign Co. v.
564 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1977) (stating
ited damages are considered a penalty,
erefore unenforceable, "if the damages
,tipulated are so excessive that they
io reasonable relationship to the actual
:es").
,he instant case, I must concede that
lant's effort to meet her burden in this
t was somewhat unfocused. Nonethehe import of the landlord's testimony,
>ss-examination, was that this was a
lation fee designed to induce complior in counsel's words, to penalize nonLance) that was not really designed to
pond to any particular range of proba4et expenditure. Although the landtestimony was that it took an average
days to re-rent an apartment (three
f it was left clean), it was conceded that
was no significant gap in occupancy
>nd no appreciable effort was expended
d a new tenant. More importantly,
was no gap in the rents received by the
rd, i.e., the landlord's judgment includk
amount of all unpaid rents owing but
1 by the tenant right up to the time of
mcy by the new tenant.
n not prepared to say that no liquidated
£es clause in a residential lease could
>e upheld. The provision in this case,
er, simply cannot be enforced where
idlord sustained no demonstrable dam)ove and beyond the unpaid rent, prop3amagp, and redecoration expense it
y is entitled to recover. The sum of
is "excessive and disproportionate"1
«w v. Kingdon, 723 P.2d 394, 397 (Utah

when compared to no expense actually incurred, or even if compared to some modest
imputed expense attributable to administrative efforts to show a vacant unit, process an
application, and fill in a few blanks on a lease
form.
At least on the facts of this case, the $531
"fee" is exactly what the landlord's counsel
called it—a penalty. Accordingly, I would
amend the judgment appealed from to delete
the penalty and leave the landlord to recover
only its actual damages.
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Tim THEMY, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
SEAGULL ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah
Corporation, Shirley K. Watson, United
Bank, a Utah Corporation, Zions First
National Bank and Murray Broadcasting C-rrr^any, Inc., Defendants and Appellants.
No. 15641.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 4, 1979.

In case concerning sale of radio station,
comprised of real property, broadcasting
equipment and FCC broadcasting license, in
which case defendants, original buyer and
its assignees, admitted that they had failed
to make required payments pursuant to
terms of two operative agreements, the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
David B. Dee, J., granted plaintiff subsequent buyer's motion for summary judgment, declaring defendants' interests to be
forfeited, and defendants appealed. The
Supreme Court, Maughan, J., held that: (1)
no material factual issue existed regarding
subsequent buyer's right to bring instant
action as successor to seller's interests in
purchase agreements with original buyer;
(2) no factual issue existed regarding subsequent buyer's compliance with remedial
provisions of agreements, and (3) district
court had power to adjudge that interests
of defendants in FCC license described in
and arising out of purchase agreement for
sale of broadcasting equipment and license
were forfeited by virtue of default of original buyer thereunder, because case at hand
was not one in which court had infringed
upon jurisdiction of FCC, and (4) under
applicable rule, appointment of receiver was
proper, where subsequent buyer's motion
for appointment had been made after defendants filed their notice of appeal.
Affirmed.

1. Appeal and Error e=>934(l), 1024.4
In reviewing a case disposed of in district court by summary judgment, Supreme
Court considers evidence in light most favorable to losing party, and affirms only
where it appears there is no genuine dispute
as to any material issues of fact, or where,
even according to facts as contended by
losing party, moving party is entitled to
judgment as a mazier of iu\v. RJICS ^I
Civil Procedure, rule 56(c).
2. Damages @=>85
A forfeiture provision of a sales contract will be upheld unless amounts retained as liquidated damages are so great
as to be unconscionable, or in nature of a
penalty.
3. Telecommunications <&=>402
As assignees from defendant original
buyer of radio station, defendants obtained
only interests held by original buyer, and
held those interests subject to original seller's rights retained by him and later assigned to subsequent buyer plaintiff.
4. Telecommunications <3=*402
Subsequent buyer, as successor to seller's interests, had right to bring action concerning sale of radio station, comprised of
real property, broadcasting equipment and
FCC broadcasting license, where subsequent buyer had been assigned all seller's
interests in his two agreements with original buyer concerning sale, seller's prior assignment to bank affected only his interest
in agreement concerning real estate, and
was simply an assignment for security
which accompanied a trust deed in favor of
bank, and, although interests which seller
assigned to subsequent buyer in real estate
agreement were subject to security interest
of bank, such did not divest seller of all
interest in agreement.
5. Telecommunications <s=»402
Subsequent buyer, who, as successor to
seller's interests in radio station sale agreement between seller and original buyer,
brought action concerning sale, had complied with remedial provisions of agreements, where notice of default was delivered to person, who was a vice president of
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original buyer and manager of radio station
operated by original buyer's assignee, such
notice informed original buyer of subsequent buyer's election to declare forfeiture
under agreements unless delinquent payments were made current within five days,
and amount necessary to remedy default
was specified, but no payments were made
in response thereto.
6. Appeal and Error c=> 170(1)
Where although, in case concerning
sale of radio station, comprised of real property, broadcasting equipment and FCC
broadcasting license, defendants made several objections to validity of notice given by
subsequent buyer, they raised such claims
for first time before Supreme Gourt, such
court declined to review them.
7. Appeal and Error o» 170(1)
In case concerning sale of radio station,
simple response to defendants' contention
that district court improperly decreed forfeiture of $79,000 down payment made by
original buyer defendant to seller, because
forfeiture of so large a sum was unconscionable penalty, was that judgment did
not address matter of down payment;
moreover, subsequent buyer plaintiff's
amended complaint requested no determination with respect to down payment, and
fact that defendants neither raised that issue in their response to pleadings nor made
any attempt before district court to have
any portion of down payment returned
meant that such issue was not properly
before Supreme Court.
8. Telecommunications <s=>402
In case concerning sale of radio station,
district court had power to adjudge that
interests of defendants in FCC license described in and arising out of purchase
agreement for sale of license was forfeited
by virtue of default of original buyer thereunder, where case was not one in which
court had infringed upon jurisdiction of
FCC, because judgment simply enforced
terms of agreement providing for forfeiture
upon default by original buyer, and declared owner of interests in license to subsequent buyer, assignee of seller's interests in

purchase agreement with original buyer,
and judgment did not require parties to
take any specific action regarding a retransfer of license. Communications Act of
1934, § 310(d), 47 U.S.C.A. § 310(d).
9. Appeal and Error <®=>448
Under rule providing that a receiver
may be appointed by court after judgment
to preserve property during pendency of an
appeal, appointment of receiver in case concerning sale of radio station, comprised of
real property, broadcasting equipment and
an FCC broadcasting license, was proper,
where plaintiff subsequent buyer's motion
for appointment had been made after defendants filed their notice of appeal. Rules
of Civil Procedure, rule 66.

Gary A. Frank, Murray, Craig T. Vincent,
W. Clark Burt, Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellants.
Steven H. Gunn, of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.
MAUGHAN, Justice:
This case concerns the sale of a radio
station, comprised of real property, broadcasting equipment and an FCC broadcasting license. Defendants admitted they had
failed to make the required payments pursuant to the terms of the two operative
agreements, and the district court granted
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment,
declaring the interests to be forfeited. Defendants contend factual issues prevent
proper disposition by summary judgment,
and the court improperly invaded the jurisdiction of the FCC by declaring defendants'
interests in the license to be forfeited. We
affirm, and award costs to plaintiff.
On June 26, 1974, the owner of KMOR
(now KPRQ) radio station, O. J. Wilkinson,
entered into two written agreements for
the sale of the station to defendant Seagull
Enterprises, Inc. (hereafter Seagull). Although one of the agreements concerned
only the sale of the real property while the
other concerned the sale of the personal
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property and the FCC license, both documents were executed simultaneously, and
each expressly stated that a breach of one
would constitute a breach of the other.
The consummation of both documents was
expressly conditioned upon FCC approval of
the transfer of the broadcasting license to
Seagull. Both documents were closely patterned after the standard Uniform Real
Estate Contract often used in this state;
for example, both provided the seller with
the same alternative remedies in the event
of a breach by buyer: 1) seller could, after
giving five days written notice, declare the
interest of buyer to be forfeited and take
possession of the premises; 2) seller could
sue for all delinquent installments; or 3)
seller could treat the contract as a note and
mortgage and proceed to foreclose according to statutory provisions and have the
property sold.
Upon obtaining FCC approval of the
transfer of the license to Seagull in December, 1974, Seagull paid the required down
payments of $5,000 for the real property
and $74,000 for the personal property and
license. No further payments were made
by Seagull under the installment payment
provisions of the contracts.
Because of Seagull's default under the
agreements, Wilkinson notified Seagull on
September 4, 1975 that Seagull's interest
would be forfeited if it failed to bring all
payments current within five days. Seagull
tendered no payments, but Wilkinson took
no further action regarding the forfeiture.
On May 26, 1976, Wilkinson entered into
an installment sale contract with plaintiff
Tim Themy (hereafter Themy) for the sale
of the radio station, including all real and
personal property and the license. Wilkinson also assigned to Themy his interest in
the purchase agreements with Seagull.
On March 8, 1977, after obtaining FCC
approval, Seagull transferred its interest in
the license and the broadcasting equipment
to defendant Shirley K. Watson, dba Murray Broadcasting Company. Thereafter,
with FCC approval, Watson assigned her

interest to defendant Murray Broadcasting
Company, Inc. (hereafter MBC).
Plaintiff's original complaint was filed in
October, 1976. In July, 1977, plaintiff filed
an amended complaint, naming, in addition
to the above defendants, United Bank and
Zions First National Bank; the interests of
the banks, however, are not in issue on
appeal. The amended complaint asked the
court to adjudge the interests of defendants
Seagull, Watson, United Bank, and MBC in
the real property to be forfeited; alternatively, it requested judgment for $245,000,
the amount owing on the contract concerning the real property, and judgment foreclosing the agreement as a mortgage according to the contract terms. Regarding
the contract to sell the personal property
and the license, the amended complaint contained four alternative prayers for relief:
1) judgment declaring the license and property to be forfeited as per the contract
terms; 2) judgment for $176,000, the
amount owing on the contract, and judgment foreclosing the agreement as a mortgage; 3) judgment declaring plaintiffs interests to be secured according to the UCC,
and allowing a sale of the collateral under
the secured transactions provisions of the
UCC; 4) judgment setting aside the conveyance by Seagull to Watson as fraudulent, and appointing a receiver to protect
the property involved in the litigation.
After reviewing the record, including affidavits and the depositions of Themy, Watson and an officer of Seagull, the district
court heard arguments of counsel and
granted Themy's motion for summary judgment. The judgment declared the interests
of Seagull, Watson, United Bank and MBC
in the real property, the personal property
and the FCC license to be forfeited according to the terms of the agreements between
Wilkinson and Seagull. The court named
Themy as the owner of all interests forfeited by virtue of Wilkinson's assignment to
Themy on May 26, 1976.
[1] As usual in reviewing a case disposed of in the district court by summary
judgment, we consider the evidence in the
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light most favorable to the losing party,1
and affirm only where it appears there is no
genuine dispute as to any material issues of
fact, or where, even according to the facts
as contended by the losing party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.2
[2,3] We note preliminarily that defendants c> ;;••: c:. :-:t the- validity ^ r enforceability of the agreements between Wilkinson and Seagull, and this Court will uphold the forfeiture provisions of such contracts, unless amounts retained as liquidated damages are so great as to be unconscionable, or in the nature of a penalty.3
Nor do defendants Watson and MBC contend their interests are insulated from the
forfeiture provisions by Seagull's assignment of its interests under the agreements.
As assignees from the purchaser, Watson
and MBC obtained only the interests held
by Seagull, and clearly hold those interests
subject to the original seller's rights retained by Wilkinson and later assigned to
Themy.4

[4] No material factual issue exists regarding Themy's right to bring this action
as successor to Wilkinson's interests. The
undisputed evidence from Themy's deposition and accompanying exhibits showed
Wilkinson assigned all his interests in both
agreements to Themy. Wilkinson's prior
assignment to Zions Bank affected only his
interest in the agreement concerning the
real estate, and was simply an assignment
for security which accompanied a Trust
Deed in favor of the bank. Although the
interests which Wilkinson assigned to Themy in the real estate agreement were indeed subject to the security interest of Zions Bank, this in no way divested Wilkinson
of all interest in the agreement, any more
than a homeowner is divested of his ownership rights by mortgaging his property.5

Defendants allege the existence of disputed facts concerning Themy's rights as
the successor to Wilkinson's interest in the
two purchase agreements which prevent
summary judgment below. To support this
claim, defendants assert Wilkinson assigned
his interest in the agreements to Zions
Bank prior to the assignment to Themy,
and thus Wilkinson had no assignable interest to convey to Themy. Defendants also
assert Wilkinson retained no enforceable
forfeiture remedies under the contracts as
they related to the FCC license, after the
FCC approved the transfer of the license to
Seagull. We address this issue at a later
point herein.

[5] Defendants next allege a factual issue exists regarding Themy's compliance
with the remedial provisions of the agreements. The agreements provide:
DEFAULT OF BUYER. In the event of
a failure to comply with the terms hereof
by the Buyer, or upon failure oi the Buyer to make any payment or payments
when the same shall become due, or within 90 days or after, the Seller, at his
option shall have the following alternative remedies:
A. Seller shall have the right upon
failure of the Buyer to remedy the default within five days after written notice, to be released from all obligations in
law and in equity to convey said property,
and all payments which have been made
theretofore on this contract by the Buyer
shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for the non-performance of
the contract .

1.

Whitman v. W. T. Grant Co., 16 Utah 2d 81,
395 P.2d 918 (1964).

4.

2.

Utah Ri:!e; cf Civ:! Procedure, 56(c); Ruffinengo v. Miller, Utah, 579 P.2d 342 (1978);
Durham v. Margetts, Utah, 571 P.2d 1332
(1977).

3.

Johnson v. Carman, Utah, 572 P.2d 371
(1977) and cases cited therein.
595 P.2d—12

Pearce v. Shurtz, 2 Utah 2d 124, 270 P.2d 442
(1954); 77 Am.Jur.2d, Vendor and Purchaser,
$ 3S9.

5. Cf. Murray First Thrift and Loan Co. v. Stevenson, Utah, 534 P.2d 909 (1975). (Vendors
could not refuse to convey title to assignee of
purchaser because assignment from purchaser
to assignee was made without vendors' approval as required by real estate contract, since
assignment was given merely as security for
loan.)
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It is undisputed that none of defendants
has made any payments under the contract
subsequent to the initial down payments.
In September, 1975, Wilkinson notified Seagull of its default, and of Wilkinson's intent
to declare a forfeiture unless the default
was remedied within five days. However,
Wilkinson took no further action, and assigned his interests to Themy in May, 1976.
Defendants allege that Wilkinson's right to
declare a forfeiture was therefore waived;
but regardless of that possibility, defendants were properly notified by Themy in
September, 1977. The notice of default was
delivered to Jay Gardner, a \ice president
of Seagull and manager of the radio station
operated by MBC. The notice informed
Seagull of Themy's election to declare a
forfeiture under the agreements unless the
delinquent payments were made current
within five days, and the amount necessary
to remedy the default was specified. No
payments were made in response to this
notice, nor have any payments been made
at any time since 1974.
[6] Although defendants make several
objections to the validity of the notice given
by Themy, they raise these claims for the
first time before us, and we therefore decline to review them.6
[7] Defendants also contend the district
court improperly decreed a forfeiture of the
$79,000 down payment made by Seagull to
Wilkinson, because the forfeiture of so
large a sum is an unconscionable penalty.
The simple response to this allegation is
that the district court merely declared der
,
nr]o"[c' intny*''5f5 i* *H^ j_>roT"><'i"t"
f^^c^'1' r\
judgment does not address the matter of
the down payment made to Wilkinson.
Moreover, plaintiff's amended complaint requests no determination by the court with
respect to the down payment to Wilkinson,
and defendants did not raise that issue in
their responsive pleadings nor did they
.6.

Hanover Limited v. Fields, Utah, 568 P 2d 751
(1977)

7. Johnson v. Carman, supra note 3 and cases
cited therein.

make any attempt before the district court
to have any portion of the down payment
returned. Defendants' reliance on cases
which hold that a forfeiture of substantial
sums paid under a contract, ostensibly as
liquidated damages, may be unconscionable,7 is therefore misplaced. In those cases,
the issue of unconscionability was properly
raised by the purchaser either by a suit to
recover sums paid or by an affirmative defense to the seller's action to declare a
forfeiture. Neither course has been pursued by defendants in this case, and the
issue is not properly before us.
[8] We turn now to the question of
whether the district court had power to
adjudicate this controversy as it relates to
the FCC license. The FCC has been empowered by Congress, in the public interest,
with exclusive jurisdiction over radio broadcasting.8 Section 310(d) of the Federal
Communications Act provides as follows:
"No construction permit or station
license, of any rights thereunder, shall be
transferred, assigned, or disposed of in
any manner, voluntarily or involuntarily,
directly or indirectly, or by transfer of
control of any corporation holding such
permit or license, to any person except
upon application to the Commission and
upon finding by the Commission that the
public interest, convenience, and necessity
will be served thereby."
Defendants contend that in view of the
above section, the district court was without power to adjudge that "the interests of
defendants Seagull Enterprises, Inc., Shirley K. Watson, United Bank and Murray
r „,

i,

s

_

r

„

f

v

•

* ^

FCr

i.cv.^<- uesciitxu in ar i :.- - o _ c: t~e
Purchase Agreement for sa'e of the broadcasting equipment and license dated June
26, 1974 are forfeited by virtue of the default of the buyer thereunder." We disagree. The district court merely determined
the respective rights of the parties under a
private agreement, and the fact that the
8. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq; Radio Station
WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 65 S.Ct.
1475, 89 LEd. 2092 (1945).
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WOW and upon finding fraud to direct a
reconveyance of the lease to the Society.
And this, even though the property consists of licensed facilities and the Society
chooses not to apply for retransfer of the
radio license to it, or the Commission,
upon such application, refuses the retransfer. The result may well be the
termination of a broadcasting station.
The Communications Act does not explicitly deal with this problem, and we find
nothing in its interstices that dislodges
the power of the States to deal with
fraud merely because licensed facilities
are involved. The "public interest" with
which the Commission is charged is that
involved in granting licenses. Safeguarding of that interest can hardly imply that
the interest of States in enforcing their
laws against fraud have been nullified
insofar as licensed facilities may be the
instruments of fraud. [326 U.S. at 131-2,
65 S.Ct. at 14S1.]

agreement concerns a radio station does not
divest the court of jurisdiction.9
In Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson,
326 U S. 120, 65 S.Ct. 1475, S9 L.Ed. 2092
(1945), an insurance society (lessor) leased a
radio station to Radio Station WOW, Inc.
(lessee) and applied to the FCC for a transfer of the license to the lessee. At the same
time, a member of the lessor sued in a
Nebraska state court to have the lease set
aside for fraud. While this suit was pending the FCC consented to the assignment of
the license to the lessee, and the lessor
transferred it and the station properties to
the lessee. The Nebraska Supreme Court
thereafter set aside the lease on the
grounds of fraud, and directed that "the
license to operate the station be returned
and that lessee be directed to do all things
necessary for that purpose; that generally
everything be done to restore the parties to
their original position prior to entering into
the lease .
" The U. S. Supreme
Court held that the Nebraska Supreme
Court "went outside its bounds when it
ordered the parties 'to do all things necessary' to secure a return of the license," I0
because the order required the lessor to ask
the FCC for a retransfer of the license to it
and required the lessee not to oppose the
transfer. The court explained that the Nebraska order, by hampering the freedom of
the lessor not to continue in broadcasting
and preventing the lessee from opposing
the revocation of its license, imposed restrictions not only upon private rights of
the parties, but also upon the licencing system which Congress had established
But the court emphasized the power of a
state court to adjudicate issues involving
FCC licenses as long as the state court does
not affirmatively interfere with the authority of the FCC to authorize the transfer,
assignment or other disposition of licenses*
We have no doubt of the power
of the Nebraska court to adjudicate, and
conclusively, the claim of fraud in the
transfer of the station by the Society to

The above view was reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court in Regents of the University System of Georgia v. Carroll, 338 U.S.
586, 70 S.Ct. 370, 94 L.Ed. 363 (1950), which
involved proceedings for the renewal of a
radio license. The FCC ruled that, unless a
contract between the licensee and a broadcasting company for the purchase of the
latter's stock were invalidated, the license
would not be renewed. After the licensee
accordingly repudiated the contract, the
broadcasting company sued in the state
courts for an accounting, obtaining a judgment in its favor The Supreme Court affirmed, stating:
the [FCC] could make a choice
only within the scope of its licensing power, i. e., to grant or deny the license on
the basis of the situation of the applicant.
It could insist that the applicant change
its situation before it granted a license,
but it could not act as a bankruptcy court
to change that situation for the applicant.
. . . The [FCC] has said frequently

9.

10. 326 U.S. at 130, 65 S.Ct at 1481

Stenger \ Stenger Broadcasting Corporation,
28 F.Supp 407 (D C Pa 1939), Regents of Urn\ersit\ System of Georgia v Carroll, 338 U S
586. 70 S Ct 370, 94 L Ed. 363 (1950)
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that controversies as to rights between
licensees and others are outside the ambit
of its powers. We do not read the Communications Act to give authority to the
[FCC] to determine the validity of contracts between licensees and others. [338
U.S. at 602, 70 S.Ct. at 378.]
The case at hand is not one in which a
state court has impinged upon the jurisdiction of the FCC. The judgment simply
enforces the terms of the agreements providing for forfeiture upon default by the
purchaser, and declares the owner of the
interests in the radio station and the license
to be Themy. It does not require the parties to take any specific action regarding a
re transfer of the license, as in Radio Station
WOW, Inc. Significantly, the judgment did
not grant Themy's requested relief for "a
mandatory injunction requiring
defendants to assist plaintiff in obtaining
transfer of the FCC license into plaintiffs
name." The judgment of the court is not
beyond its authority, under the law as outlined above.11
[9] Finally, we turn to defendants' allegation of error in the district court's order
appointing a receiver for the interests forfeited under the agreements. Rule 66,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
11. See also In Re Assignment of License of
Station
WMCA,
10 FCC 241, Big League
Broadcasting
Co, Inc \ Shedd-Agard
Broad-

(a) Grounds for Appointment. A receiver may be appointed by the court in
which an action is pending or has passed
to judgment:
*
*
*
*
*
*
(4) After judgment, to dispose of the
property according to the judgment, or to
preserve it during the pendency of an
appeal, or in proceedings in aid of execution when an execution has been returned
unsatisfied, or when the judgment debtor
refuses to apply his property in satisfaction of the judgment. [Emphasis added.]
The appointment of the receiver in this case
was clearly proper under the rules, Themy's
motion for appointment having been made
after defendants filed their notice of appeal. We find no error on the part of the
district court.
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS, HALL
and STEWART, JJ., concur.
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casting, Inc, La A p p , 313 So 2d 247 (1975):
Stenger v Stenger Broadcasting
Corporation,
supra note 9
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J., entered summary judgment for transferee
and appeal was taken. The Supreme Court,
Zimmerman, C.J., held that: (1) statute invalidating restrictions on shares, unless legend appeared on certificate, was limited to
restrictions imposed by corporation and did
not extend to restriction agreed upon by
shareholders, and (2) fact issue existed as to
whether shareholders had waived first refusal rights.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Appeal and Error c=>S63
In renewing entitlement to summary
judgment, Supreme Court determines only
whether trial court erred in applying governing law and whether trial court correctly held
there were no disputed issues as to material
fact. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c).
2. Statutes 0184, 217.4
Only when there is ambiguity in statute's plain language do courts need to seek
guidance from legislative history and relevant policy considerations.

, INC., a Utah corporation dba Budlent-A-Car of Salt Lake; Paul Tayindividually; and Michael Taylor,
idually, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
B. KOROULIS, and Montana
id Produce Co., Inc., a Utah corpon, Defendants and Appellees.
No. 930506.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 16, 1994.
Shearing Denied Feb. 8, 1995.
uer and shareholders brought suit
one shareholder and putative transilleging breach of shareholder agreender which transferring shareholder
luired to first offer shares to corporaother shareholders. The District
Salt Lake County, Richard H. Moffat,

3. Corporations 0=113
Statute providing that restriction on
transfer of security "imposed" by issuer was
ineffective against person without actual
knowledge, unless restriction was conspicuously noted on security, did not apply to bar
claim by sharehuidei ? that they had right to
acquire stock pledged by another shareholder; restriction had been agreed upon by
shareholders, rather than being imposed by
corporatiun through charter, bylaws or corporate resolution. U.C.A.1953, 70A-S-204.
4. Judgment olS5.3(l)
Assuming that statute invalidating restrictions on shares imposed by issuer, in
absence of restrictive legend on certificate or
actual knowledge on part of holder, applied
also to ivsti^t^i:- imposed by ^grc.mcr.t
among shareholders buyer of securities
which did not have legend was nonetheless
not entitled to summary judgment: buyer
could still be bound by restrictions if it had
actual knowledge of them, and affidavit by
representative stating that buyer had not
been informed of restriction by personnel of
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seller did not foreclose possibility that actual
knowledge had been acquired from some other source. U.C.A.1953, 70A-S-204; Rules
Civ.Proc., Rule 56(e).
5. Appeal and Error OS54(l), S56(l)
Grant of summary judgment may be
affirmed on any ground, even one not relied
on by tri?l court.
6. Estoppel 052.10(2)
Waiver requires (1) existing right, benefit or advantage, (2) knowledge of its existence, and (3) intention to relinquish right.
7. Judgment 0185.3U)
Material issues of fact, precluding summary judgment, existed as to whether shareholders had waived right to insist upon having opportunity to match offer before any
shareholder could transfer shares; shareholder gave affidavit that he had been requested to consent to pledge of shares and
had refused to do so, and that he had not
been given advance notice of transfer of
shares or opportunity to meet offer, as provided for under shareholder's agreement.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(e).

Donald J. Winder, Kathy A.F. Davis, Robert D. Tingey, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs.
lurk W. Bennett. John C. Green. Kim M.
Luhn. Salt Lake City, for Korouhs.
1.

Korou'^ aid the Ta\lnrs were the SOIL stockholdcis in K ^ T

2.

The Stockholders Agreement proudes as follow*
1 Resru ' oils Duni^ Lifetime of Stockholder No SiOwUioldc* shaM trai^fei CT cUiiT»h •
I is ihaics ot capual stock ot the Corporation
uhether piescntlv owned oi to be acquired, to
j"I ,VIM l i ( i v.Oip ration wrthoi ! c con
sent of the other Stockholders unless the StockllOiUCl

>uv -> .

c

iu

I M K \ . iiiw

uaiibiwl

Ui

w.Jvaiii

biance (hereinafter referred to as the Transferor)
shall ha\e hist mad*, the olfer to sell, hereinattci
described and sMch offer shall not have been
accepted
U) Ojfci b\ T)ansie)0) The offer shall be
gnen to the Corporation and to the other
Stockholders and shall consist of an offu to
sell all the shdies. of capital slock of the Coipolation owned b\ the Transferor to which offu
shall be attached a statement of intention to

John W. Call, Craig T. Vincent, Curtis C*
Xes&et, Salt Lake City, for Montana Brand'
Produce Co.
-rl
-U

ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice:
Plaintiffs K & T, Inc., and Paul and Mi-"
chael Taylor appeal from the district court's^
grant of nummary ji dement in favor of de—
*:- ' t M'v.utia Bi^id Pi.» iu e Co. ^ \
reverse and remand.
^
"Before we recite the facts, we note that inreviewing a grant of summary judgment, we^
\iew the facts and all reasonable inferences^
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable^
to the nonmoung pam." Htggins v. Salt:
Lake County. S55 P-d 231. 233 (Utah 1993)J
"We state the facts m this case accordingly." \
K & T ib a closely held Utah corporation!
which owns and operates a rental-car fraiir*
chise along the Wasatch Front. On June 30,^
1981, K & T, the Taylors, and George Ko-'l
rouhs l entered into an agreement ("Stock-1
holders' Agreement") governing any transfer^
or encumbrance of K & T stock. To present
outsiders from gaining a right to share in thej
management of K & T. the stockholders"1
agreed to restrict the transfer or encum-*
brance of K & T stock This restriction took I
the form of a preemptive right on the part of-*
K & T and its stockholders to purchase anyj|
K &. T stock that a stockholder intended toJ
transfer or encumber* The Stockholders'?
Agi eement specifically Drovided that allfj
c tU
tra^s^e-- o- . - C u ^
e c^c ma> be, ard>
the number of shares of cap'ta! stock in\olvcd,1
which shah be all ot his shaies
* ^
(h) A <e~' - e of tile 0,'ei
Within thirty1
(30) da\s after receipt of such offer the Corpo<
tauon ma\, at Us option, elect to purchase all^
but not !esN t nan uli, of tr.e ^ha.es ot stocky
owned b\ the Transleror If the offer is ngy
nccentcd b\ the Cor^onnon witrVn that timc,<
the othei Stockholders ma\, within forty-fiv^

option, purchase on a pro-rata basis all of sarOy
Auics uf capual MO»A In the c\ent any on*
or moic of the indn di rl Stockholders
^\M
purchase all of the shares he is entitled**^
purchase, such shares shall be available to lift
iemainmg Stockholders on a pro-rata basils
within ten (10) da>s additional alter such avajL
uoiht\ The acceptance b\ an\ such Oitcrg
shall be in writing
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part of the additional collateral providKoroulis and BMS to FSB under the
arance Agreements, Koroulis executed
reement under which he pledged to
his shares of K & T stock ("Pledge
ment"). Richard H. Pope, a vice presiof FSB. reviewed the Stockholders'
ment and determined that the consent
K & T stockholders was necessary for
1 pledge of Koroulis' stock.: Pope chattorneys for FSB to prepare a congreement for lvvicw and e\e:ut:or. by
Taylor, then vice president of K & T
the execution of the Pledge Agreement
roulis. Pope met with Paul Taylor on
1 occasions in an attempt to obtain his
t to the pledge. Paul Taylor refused
i the first consent agi-eement, a fiveocument prepared by FSB's attorneys.

Pope then directed attorneys for FSB to
draft a "simpler" consent agreement, which
Paul Taylor also refused to sign. Neither K
& T nor the Taylors ever consented to the
pledge of K & T stock by Koroulis to FSB.
BMS and Koroulis eventually defaulted on
their obligations to FSB under the Forbearance Agreements. Sometime after the default, Koroulis and BMS contacted Montana
Brand to request that Montana Brand purchase FSB's interest in the Koroulis and
BMS loans. After Montana Brand tentatively agreed to such an arrangement, FSB
drafted an agreement by which FSB would
sell its interest in the Koroulis and BMS
loans, along with the collateral securing those
loans, to Montana Brand ("Loan Sale Agreement").
At the time the Loan Sale Agreement was
executed, Robert G. Maxfield. secretary of
Montana Brand, reviewed FSB's loan file.
Although the file did contain a copy of the
Pledge Agreement. Maxfield asserted in an
affidavit that the file did not contain a copy
of either the proposed consent agreements or
the Stockholders' Agreement. Discovery
conducted after the trial court dismissed
FSB from the case reveals, however, that the
Stockholders' Agreement and the proposed
consent agreements were in the file. Maxfield also asserted via affidavit that 4*[n]either
[he] nor, to the best of [hi>] knowledge,
anyone at Montana Brand was informed of
the existence of the Consent Agreement or
the Stockholders' Agreement ly pcr^;:nJ.
from First Security [Bank] M
Sometime arcur.d May 2S, lt??2, M.:::«r.M
Brand sent Paul Taylor a letter claiming that
Koroulis and BMS had defaulted on their
loan obligations and that Montana Brand was
therefore the owner of Koroulis stock under
the terms of the Pledge Agreement. In his
affidavit, Paul Taylor averred that this letter
was the "first information [he recened] that

agraph 15 of the Stockholders' Agreement
des for the endorsement of the following
ction upon the stock certificates.

4. The first agreement was dated March 25, 1991,
a second was dated September 17 1991 and a
third was dated Decembet 2, 1991.

' transfer of the shares of stock represented
this certificate is restricted under the tei ms
*n Agreement dated June 30. 19S1, a cop\
vhich is on file in the office of the Corporai. subject to amendments.

5. Each of the indiudual forbearance agiecments
prou'ded. as a condition of foiboaiar.ct. that
Koroulis deh\er a consent agreement, executed
bv the stockholders of K. & T. consenting to the
pledge.

certificates were to be surrendered to
T and endorsed with a restrictive enment.3 Nevertheless, no such endorsewas ever placed upon Koroulis' stock
tcates.
August 31,1990, Bountiful Motor Sales,
"BMS"), a corporation owned by Ko, entered into a financing agreement
Dealership Loan") with First Security
("FSB"). At approximately the same
FSB made a number of personal loans
>roulis. BMS eventually defaulted on
ealership Loan, and Koroulis defaulted
3 personal obligations. After the de, Koroulis, BMS. and FSB entered into
ies of forbearance, eross-eollateralizamd loan agreements ("the Forbearance
ments").4 Pursuant to these agree, Koroulis and BMS provided FSB with
onal collateral for the Dealership Loan,
extended additional credit to BMS and
lis, all of the loans were cross-defaulted
Toss-collateralized, and certain other
and conditions were imposed on the
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the Pledge Agreement had been executed, or
that Montana Brand claimed an interest in
[Koroulis'] shares." In response to the letter, Paul Taylor informed Montana Brand
that K & T and the Taylors were entitled to
purchase the stock for an amount set forth in
the Stockholders' Agreement. When Montana Brand declined the request, K & T and
the Taylors brought this action against Koroulis and Montana Brand in Utah's Third
Judicial District Court.6
On April 30, 1992, K & T and the Taylors
moved for summary judgment, asking the
district court to declare that Koroulis had
breached the Stockholders' Agreement and
that K & T and the Taylors were entitled to
purchase Koroulis' stock as set forth in the
Stockholders' Agreement. In response,
Montana Brand filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. In its cross-motion, Montana Brand asserted that (i) section 70A-&204 of the Code7 rendered the restriction on
transfer contained in the Stockholders'
Agreement ineffective because the restriction
was never endorsed on the stock certificates
and Montana Brand took the stock without
actual knowledge of the restriction; and (ii)
the Taylors and K & T waived the right to
enforce the restriction. In response to Montana Brand's cross-motion for summary judgment, K & T and the Taylors argued that
section 70A-8-204 applied only to restric6. On August 17, 1992, Montana Brand filed a
tVi»rr].n;?r»\ c ornr> '? ,r > r a^iir^* FSB allesrnn faaud
and misrepresentation in connection with the
Loan Sale Agreement Montana Brand claimed
tha: FSB had fa VJ ^ d.>c!o.e that the t : a - f a :
of K <& T stock was restricted bv the Stockholders Agreement FSB mo\ed to dismiss, claiming that Montana Biand had failed to perform
due diligence prior to entering into the Loan Sale
Agreement with FSB The district court agreed,
stating:
Montana Brand[] was perfectly free to talk to
the btockholdeis and just as able to do bo Jb
[FSB] had been Wheic there weie no inhibitions placed in the path of Montana Brandf ] to
do any investigation it wished in icgard to the
transaction and it failed to make such inquin
it cannot now be heard to complain
7. Section 70A-S-204 pro\ides in relc\ant part as
follow s
A reduction on tiansfer of a secuntv imposed
bv the issuer, c\en though otherwise lawful, is

tions "imposed by the issuer" of the securities. Because the restriclion at issue here'
was agreed to by all of the stockholders
rather than imposed by K & T, the effective?
ness of the restriction should be measured by
reference to section 70A-8-302 of the Code$
rather than to section 70A-8-204.
^
At a hearing on June 21, 1993, the district
court granted Montana Brand's cross-motion
for summary judgment. In so doing, it concluded as a matter of law that section 70A-8i
204 was applicable "[bjecause the Stockholders['] Agreement is actually between K & Tand the three stockholders of K & T, [and];
the restriction on transfer . . . was imposed"
by the issuer of the stock." Furthermore,
relying on the Maxiield affidavit, the district,
court concluded that Montana Brand took"
the stock without actual knowledge of any
restriction on the transfer of the stock. K &
T and the Taylors appeal, claiming that (i)
the trial court erred when it relied on section'
70A-8-204 rather than on section 70A-S-302
to measure the effect of the restriction on
transfer contained in the Stockholders'^
Agreement, and (ii) even if section 70A-8-'
204 is applicable, genuine issues of material
fact exist which preclude summai\ judgment
[1] We first state the applicable standard
of renew. Summary judgment is appropri-j
ate only when no genuine issues of material
fact exist and the moving party is entitled to
ineffective against any person without actual;
knowledge of '* r 1 ' ^
'***
(1) the secunt\ is certificated and the restrict
uon is noted conspicuous!) on the instru%
r
rent
Utah Code Ann § 70A-3-204
, ',*?
8. Section 70A-8-302 prouder in rele\ant part ajn
(\) A bona fide puicha<er" u» a pu^chabCft
for \?!ue in good faith and without notice of'
an\ adverse claim
^
(a) who takes deliver} of a cciuficated SCCIK
4it\ in bearer toim oi in registered fonfy£
issued or indoised to him oi in blank; >tS
(2) Adverse claim ' includes a claim thatjfcj
transfer was or would be wrongful or that fl£
particular adverse person is the owner of 0§j
has an interest in the sccurit\
' J^£
(3) \ bona fide purchaser in addition to aCg
quiring the rights of a purchase! under Scctiojk
70A-S-301, also acquires his interest in$M
sccuiit\ fice of an\ adveise claim.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-S-302
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ent as a matter of law. Utah R.Civ P. P2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991) "Onh when we
Higgvis, 855 P2d at 235 Because find ambiguity in the statute's plain language
ment to summary judgment is a ques- need we seek guidance fiom the legislate e
f law, we accord no deference to the history and rele\ ant policy considerations "
•ouit's resolution of the legal issues World Peace M oi e ment of Am i Xeuspopn
ited Higgins, S55 P2d at 235, Fenee Agency Coip 879 P 2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994),
e, 784 P 2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) "We tee also SchuHz, 814 P2d at 1112 ('We fust
line only whethei the trial court erred look to the statute's plain language Only if
dying the governing law and whether w*e find some ambiguity need we look fural court conectly held that there were ther."), Bnnkerkoft, 779 P.2d at m (holding
puted issues of material factM Fervee that if "statutory language is plain and unam2d at 151 (citing Bushnell Real Estate, biguous, this Couit will not look be\ond the
Xiehoa 672 P2d 746, 749 (Utah same to drune legislate e intent')
Bonen v Rnerton City, 656 P 2d 434,
[3] While the Code defines the temis "is;tah 1982)).
suer" 9 and "know ledge," lu it does not define
first question is whether the district the teim 'imposed ' Common u>age of the
erred when it held that the transfei word, howe\er, is quite clear from othei
tion contained in the Stockholders' sources Accoidmg to Webstei's, to impose
ment is an issuer-imposed restriction is u l To enact or appl} as compulson
s critical because section 70A-8-204 2 To apply oi make pi e\ ail b\ oi as if b\
es that onl} 4 [a] lestuction on tiansfei authonty
3 To obtrude oi foice (eg
2cunt\ imposed by the issuer" is mef- oneself) upon anothei or othei s ' Web^tc,\
» against any person without actual II Nen Rivei'side Unneisity Dutioncny 614
sdge unless the restriction is conspicu- (1984) These definition* contemplate a situnoted on the secunty (Emphasis add- ation wheie one is foiced to comnh with the
[f the restriction at issue was not "im- dnecti\e of anothei In the context of the
by K & T but b} the stockholder, piesent case, the reduction on tiansfei
I 70A-8-204 does not apply
would be l^uei-imposed if it weie contained
i n K & T s chaitei or b\laws oi m a coipoWhen faced with a question of statulate l evolution If such weie the case the
onstruction, we look first to the plain
stockholdeis of K & T would ha\e no cnoice
ige of the statute State i Lai sen, S65
but to comply with tne teims ot the lestiic
1355, 1357 (Utah 1993), Schuiiz i
tion ll
ofX Am Inc 814 P2d 1108 1112
1991\ Bnnkerkoft v Foisyth 779
In the case at hand, howe\ei each of the
65, b6b (Utah 1989;, see also Boiuauu stOCkliOldfcJls VolunUilil^ a g l c c u tD LOlttui i c
»a,\ 7SS P2d 497 500 'Utah 19S9) ^trct^nn- on the I light to t1 m-fpi then
Liidiu; ( Unambiguous langui*&e . 4 [">] ^ a i . ?K i T T'e n*i* f ct t W K ^ T
3
may not be interpreted to conn adict is a pait\ to the agieement does not change
in meaning ") In construing a statute its \oluntaiv natuie Absent the Stockholdume that "each teim in the statute was eis Agieement K & T would be poweiless
dvisedly thus the statuton woids aie to contiol the disposition ot am oi the shaie^
tei alh unless such a I eading is um ea- oi k i T stock Accuidihgn, we tuncldue
that the lestuction at issue heie was not
y confused or mopeiable ' Saiage In
*mposed' b\ K &. T S'e aho I C C % fcInc i Utah State Ta* Commn 811
ih Code Ann § 70A-8-201
tah Code Ann § 70A-l-201(25)(b)
for instance K i T s boa-d of duectors
^ t d and the stockholders of K 6. T dp
^d a b\la\v which mandated that no K ^ T
holder eouid sell his K <L T stock unless

thosc shares were fust offcicd to the other stock
holders that restriction would be imposed b\ the
coipoiation and Uuu'd be bindm_ c\cn on tl osc
stockholdcis that \otcd against tic b\'a\\
TuVu Dn\L-In C0/7; 1 Ashkiis 61 Cal 2d 283 3S
CalRp'i US 348-SO 391 P 2d &2J> 825-30
(1964) The efficac\ of such 1 lestuction as
against a thud part\ would be measured b\
section 70A-8-204
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204 cmt. 6 (indicating that section 8-204 does
not apply to "private agreements between
stockholders containing restrictive covenants
as to the sale of the security").
Montana Brand makes much of the first
sentence of the Stockholders' Agreement,
which states that it is an agreement "by and
between George B. Koroulis, Paul F. Taylor,
and P. Michael Taylor, hereinafter referred
to as 4Stockholders[,]' . . . individually, and K
& T Corporation—Budget-Rent-A-Car, a
Utah Corporation, hereinafter referred to as
'Corporation.'" According to Montana
Brand, this language indicates that the
Stockholders' Agreement "was not merely
among the stockholders of K & T but was
actually an agreement between the stockholders of K & T on the one side and K & T,
the issuer, on the other side." We think that
Montana Brand's interpretation of this introductory language is untenable. This language simply indicates that there are four
parties to the Stockholders' Agreement,
three individual stockholders and K & T.
Koroulis and the Taylors are listed together
for convenience, because they are each individuals rather than corporate entities, rather
than to indicate that they are on one side of
the agreement and K & T is on the other.
[4] We note that even if we were to
conclude that section 70A-S-204 were applicable, it would still be necessary to remand
because Montana Brand failed to meet its
affirmative burden, as the party moving for
summary judgment, of establishing that
there were no disputed material issues of
M 1
fact. See Lamb > P
Corp., S69 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1993) ("The
party moving for summary judgment must
establish a right to judgment based on the
applicable law as applied to an undisputed
material issue of fact."). Section 70A-8-204
provides that "[a] restriction on transfer of a
security imposed by the issuer" L> ineffective
against any person without actual knowledge
unless the restriction is conspicuously noted
on the security. Thus, to prevail undei section 70A-S-204, Montana Brand must show
that there are no disputed material issues of
fact regarding its lack of actual knowledge.
Unless it does so. the paity opposing the
motion is under no obligation to demonstrate

that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id?
928; Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e); cf. Thayne v. 5$
eficial Utak Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Ut£p
1994).
Here, Montana Brand presented a careftj^
ly tailored affidavit in which Maxfield testfL
fied that "[n]either [he] nor, to the bes^oflf
[his] knowledge, anyone at Montana Bran^l
was informed of the existence of the Consent!
Agreement or the Stockholders' Agreement
by personnel from First Security [Bankf$%
(Emphasis added.) Montana Brand also s u ^
mitted an admission on the part of Koroulj&l
that he had never informed Montana Brand/1
about the restriction. These two pieces^ojfl
evidence do not foreclose the possibility that^
Montana Brand acquired actual knowledge of|
the restrictions from some other sourelpl
Thus, K & T and the Taylors were under n | |
obligation to come forward with specific factjfshowing that there was a genuine issue f<w£|
trial. Cf. Utah R.Civ.P. 5Gtej. Because!
Montana Brand did not demonstrate its enti-^
tlement to summary judgement based on aiJS
undisputed fact, summary judgment was in?§
appropriate. Lcvab, S69 P.2d at 928. {>#4
?•*£*

[5] Montana Brand argues that even if j
we find section 70A-8-204 inapplicable, wel
should still affirm on a ground not reliedi
upon by the trial court: to wit, that K &]¥%
and the Taylors waived their right to enforc^H
the Stockholders' Agreement. Mcroanju
Brand correctly points out that we rcay^^Eg
firm a grant of nummary judgment on any<3
ground, even one not relied upon by the trialjl
court Whit* > D^eelhfn^t ^79 P2d 1371,^
IO.U vLian iyy4;, iuoi L. inumi>un ^eitsp^i^
per.% 872 P.2d 999, 1012 n. 22 (Utah 1994^
P OA -sf o n
nl 20 Hsjgins.
"Howevsiofl?
er. any rationale for affirming a deeisiofl*
must find support in t^e record." Hill P *
Seattle Fint Natl Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246§
'Utah 1992) We fi«d no support in the4
record for a grant of summary judgment$B#
the waiver theorv.
f^H
[6] A \\ai\er is an intentional relinquish^
ment of a known right. Soters Inc. v- Deswm
et Fed. Sav & Loan .4*0?. S57 P.2d ?38g
939-40 (Utah 1993;. "Waiver requires t h ^ J
elements: (1) an existing right, benefit,^|g
advantage; (2; knowledge of its existenfigfi
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) an intention to relinquish the right."
940. The intention to relinquish the
nay be either expressed or implied and
e implied from action or inaction. Id.
Here, summary judgment on the iswaiver would have been inappropriate
e K & T and the Taylors have met
Durden under rule 56(e) of the Utah
of Civil Procedure to demonstrate that
IS

«

.I*,.*...-

i^-^-ivj

/

vl.~ i.

£ alii

testified via affidavit as follows:
i no time did any of the plaintiffs conto a pledge by Koroulis of his stock to
t Security Bank ("FSB"). Although I
approached in approximately March of
by Richard Pope, a representative of
I, twice in personal meetings (at loca51 can't recall) and various other times
elephone, regarding plaintiffs' consent
proposed pledge by Koroulis, plaintiffs
ach instance refused to execute the
I of consent agreement submitted by
\—
Subsequent to March of 1991
itiffs had no further contacts with FSB
koroulis (or anyone else) regarding the
ge.
i fact Koroulis told me subsequently,
two separate occasions, in telephone
•ersations, not to worry, he didn't need
itiffs' consents, the first such occasion
rring a day or two after the second
>osed Consent Agreement was presento me (approximately March 28, 1991).
u or about May 28, 1992, I received a
T from counsel for Montana Brand
luce Company. Inc
In that letter,
tana Brand claims ownership'of 15.000
e- of K & T, Inc. stock previously
ed by Koroulis. Plaintiffs' first inforon that the Pledge Agreement had
i executed, or that Montana Brand
ned an interest in the shares at issue,
e upon plaintiffs' receipt of said letter
i counsel for Montana Brand making
fence to the Agreement.
aintiffs at no time received notice from
ttilis, as required by paragraph 1 of
Stockholders' Agreement, regarding
Proposed pledge to FSB and providing
itiffs a right to exercise their purchase
>n contained therein.

Accepting Taylor's statements as true, as we
must do on appeal from a summary judgment, Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d
104, 107 (Utah 1991), we are led to the
inescapable conclusion that genuine issues of
fact exist as to whether there was a waiver.
We reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
STEWART, A.C.J., and HOWE,
DURHAM and RUSSOX, JJ., concur.
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party conveying stock to plaintiff. The
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Stewart M. Hanson, J., granted plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment, and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court,
Callister, C. J., held, inter alia, that maker's
affidavit whereby he swore that he had
been informed by third party that third
party had in fact settled the account, being
hearsay and based on information and belief, did not conform to the requirements of
rule and did not preclude entry of summary
judgment.
Affirmed.

1. Judgment 0=^185.1(3)

Affidavit supporting or opposing a
motion for summary judgment must be
made on personal knowledge of the affiant.
set forth facts that would be admissible in
evidence, and show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 56(e).
2. Judgment C=>I85.3(I6)

29 Utah 2d 58
T E R N STATES T H R I F T AND LOAN
COMPANY, a corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Vayne T. BLOMQUIST, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 12872.

Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 18, 1972.

iCtion was brought to recover on a
ssory note, and maker pleaded as an
lative defense that the obligation had
compromised and settled by a third

On motion of plaintiff for summary
judgment in action to recover on a promissory note, maker's opposing affidavit
wherein he stated that he was informed by
third person that the third person had settled the account in full, being hearsay and
based on information and belief, did not
conform to the requirements of rule, and
did not constitute a showing of a genuine
issue for trial sufficient to preclude entry
of summary judgment. Rules of Civil
Procedure, rules 56, 56(e).
3. Judgment 0 = 186

There was no error in entering summary judgment for plaintiff at time wrier*
interrogatories submitted to the plaintiff
had not been answered, where there was
no indication that the matter was Lrougbt
to the attention of the trial court and
where the time sequence, showing that interrogator:) were bujmitted after filing of
motion for summary judgment and long

I. Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale. 121 Utah 359, 242 P.2d 297 (1952).
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after institution of suit, indicated that interrogatories were submitted as a tactic of
delay.
4. Appeal and Error <£=I073(I)
Judgment C=>I84
Ten-day notice requirement of summary judgment rule was not jurisdictional
and alleged insufficiency of notice did not
result in reversible error where defendant's
rights were not adversely affected. Rules
of Civil Procedure, rules 6(e), 56(c).
Ronald C. Barker, Salt Lake City, for
defendant-appellant.
E. H. Fankhauser, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff-respondent.
CALLISTER, Chief Justice:
Plaintiff initiated this action to recover
on a promissory note, which defendant, as
maker, had executed and delivered to
plaintiff, as payee. Defendant as an affirmative defense, pleaded that the obligation had been paid by means of a compromise and settlement by a third party, who
had conveyed and delivered to plaintiff
certain corporate stock. Plaintiff submitted certain interrogatories to defendant,
which were duly answered. Thereafter the
court granted plaintiff's motion to produce
all cancelled checks, receipts, money orders, or other evidence of payments made
by defendant to plaintiff as set forth in defendant's answer to plaintiff's interrogatories. Approximately ten months later, defendant responded that after diligent
search, he had been unable to locate any
s-'ch papers. A few days later, plaintiff
filed a motion for summary judgment,
which was accompanied by an affidavit.
Upon hearing, plaintiff's motion was
granted, and plaintiff was awarded judgment. Defendant's motion for a new trial
was denied, and he appeals.
Defendant contends that the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment, since
there was a disputed factual issue, specifically, whether the debt had been compromised and settled by a third party conveying stock to plaintiff.

In response to plaintiff's interrogatories
defendant claimed that one Xorman Havs
had settled the claim. However, defendant
specifically stated that he had no knowledge of the date of the alleged compromise, name of the stock delivered, or the
number of shares. He knew of no documents evidencing the compromise. In regard to a question, concerning payments
and amounts, he cited dates prior to the
date of the execution of the note (December 28, 1967); in fact, the latest payment
claimed was May 24, 1967. Finally, defendant responded "unknown" to an interrogatory, concerning the value of the corporate stock and how and by whom such
value was determined.
The affidavit accompanying plaintiff's
motion, was a sworn statement by Mr.
Green, plaintiff's manager, who swore to
the execution and delivery of the note, and
the fact that no payment had been made.
He further stated that the note was a renewal for a prior existing obligation
of defendant, upon which he had made
payments, and for which he had been given
full credit. The affiant further swore that
at no time had anyone on behalf of plaintiff entered into a compromise agreement
with a third par*y by the raine of Xorman
Hays or any other person to settle the obligation on behalf of defendant.
Defendant filed an opposing affidavit,
wherein he stated that the original loan
was in his name and that of Xorman Hays,
and that he was informed and believed that
the picoent manager of plaintiff was not
so employed at the time of the loan and
subsequent renewals; and, therefore, the
manager's affidavit was hearsay and improper to support plaintiff's motion. Defendant swore that he was informed by
Xorman Hays that he had, in fact, settled
th** account in full by means of p^.;:~:*t in
stock. Defendant stated that the note was
not a new loan but a renewal of other
notes to winch XToiman I I a \ s was a party,
and there was no balance owing.
[1] \n ?ffiHp\it importing or opposing a motion for summary judgment is an
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ntiary affidavit, whose form and conis governed by Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P.
an affidavit must be made on personowledge of the affiant, set forth facts
would be admissible in evidence, and
affirmatively that the affiant is comlt to testify to the matters stated
'in.*
Affidavits containing statements made
rely "on information and belief will
disregarded. Hearsay testimony and
inion testimony that would not be adssible if testified to at the trial may
t properly be set forth in an affidavit.

i

'] The assertions in defendant's affit, which were essential to create a genissue as to a material fact, were based
nformation and belief and hearsay, and
not conform to the requirements of
i 56(e), U.R.C.P. Since defendant did
beyond the allegations in his answer,
forth by affidavit or otherwise as proid in Rule 56, U.R.C.P., specific facts
u'ing that there was a genuine issue for
1, the trial court, based on the plead>, interrogatories, and the affidavit of
ntiffs manager properly entered judgit.

3] Defendant further contends that at
time the summary judgment was en*d, he had submitted interrogatories to
intiff, which had not been answered,
i that the answers thereto might have
lbhshed his defense of accord and satistion.
There is nothing in the record to indie that this matter was brought to the attinn of the trial court, i.e , there is no
idavit to that effect. The interrogatos were filed after plaintiff had filed its
Rainfonl v. Ryttins, 22 Utah 2*1 232. 2.15,
451 P.2d 7bU tl^ot>) , iJre*ton v. Lumu.
20 r t n h 2rl 200, 2G3, 436 P.2d 1021
(196S).

motion for summary judgment. The time
sequence strongly indicates that the interrogatories were submitted as a tactic of delay. The complaint was filed August 19,
1970, and the answer on September 21,
1970. Plaintiff's interrogatories were filed
October 1, 1970 and the response on November 12, 1970. Plaintiff filed its motion
to produce documents on November 19,
and the motion was granted on November
30, 1970. Thereafter, the record indicates
total inactivity until September 9, 1971,
when plaintiff filed a request for a trial
setting. On October 1, 1971, defendant
filed a response to the production of docum e n t . On Octootr 12, i>71, plaintiff : \1
its motion for summary judgment; the day
after defendant filed his interrogatories.
Under the circumstances of the instant
case, the action of the trial court cannot be
deemed inappropriate.
[4] Defendant further asserts that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter
judgment since the notice of hearing accompanying the motion set the date of
hearing on October 18, 1971, a time less
than the requisite 10 day notice provided in
Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P. Defendant claims an
additional three day period was required,
since the service was by mail, Rule 6(e),
U.R.C.P.
Defendant has not cited any authority
to the effect that the 10 d^y rotice requirement is jurisdictional. Under the circumstances of the instant case, the alleged insufficiency of notice did not adversely affect defendant's rights. The judgment of
the trial court is affirmed. Costs to plaintiff.
TUCKETT, ELLETT, HEXRIOD, and
CROCKETT, JJ., concur.
2. 6 Moore's Federal Practice. § 56.22 [1].
W>. 2S0G-2<W

